The Supreme Court\u27s Antiretaliation Principle by Moberly, Richard
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 2
2010
The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle
Richard Moberly
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 375 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol61/iss2/3
 2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM 
  
375 
 
ARTICLES 
THE SUPREME COURT’S 
ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE 
Richard Moberly† 
ABSTRACT 
In five cases issued during the last five years, the Supreme Court 
interpreted statutory antiretaliation provisions broadly to protect 
employees who report illegal employer conduct. These decisions 
conflict with the common understanding of the Court as pro-employer 
and judicially conservative. In a sixth retaliation decision during this 
time, however, the Court interpreted constitutional antiretaliation 
protection narrowly; an act that fits with the Court’s pro-employer 
image but diverges from the antiretaliation stance it appeared to take 
in the other five retaliation cases. This Article explains these 
seemingly anomalous results by examining the last fifty years of the 
Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. In doing so, a persistent 
theme emerges: the “Antiretaliation Principle.” This Principle 
advances the notion that protecting employees from retaliation will 
enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws. Interestingly, although 
the Court has used the Antiretaliation Principle for a half-century to 
strengthen statutory protections against employer retaliation, it also 
has demonstrated consistently that it considers the Antiretaliation 
Principle primarily a statutory, rather than constitutional, norm.  
The Antiretaliation Principle explains the Court’s recent cases and 
provides a reasoned and consistent standard against which they can 
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be evaluated. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation 
Principle provides important lessons for lower courts as they confront 
the need to protect whistleblowing employees from employer 
retaliation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In each of five recent cases involving statutory-based employee 
retaliation claims, the Supreme Court has upheld the employee’s 
claim and expanded protections against employer retaliation.1 A sixth 
employment retaliation case, however, which was based on an alleged 
violation of an employee’s First Amendment rights, reached a 
dramatically different result. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the Court found 
in favor of the employer and severely restricted constitutional 
antiretaliation protection.3  
                                                                                                                 
1 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 
852–53 (2009) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); CBOCS W., Inc. v. 
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. 
Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56–57 (2006) (interpreting 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 
171 (2005) (interpreting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
3 See id. at 426 (holding that the First Amendment did not protect government employees 
who speak about matters of public concern if the employee’s statements were made pursuant to 
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Together these cases present a confusing and seemingly 
contradictory view of the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. On the 
one hand, the Court’s holdings in the five statutory cases could 
indicate that the Court favors employees in retaliation cases—a 
conclusion that would strike many commentators as odd given the 
Court’s decidedly mixed record of protecting employee rights over 
the past decade.4 On the other hand, the Court’s Garcetti opinion 
significantly narrowed government employees’ protection when they 
blow the whistle on employer misconduct,5 perhaps indicating a 
deeper resistance to retaliation protection. Moreover, as explained in 
more detail below, taken together, the Court’s opinions appear 
untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy, often confounding 
commentators.6 
This Article attempts to bring consistency and cohesion to this 
morass by placing these recent retaliation cases in the context of a 
half-century of Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence. This process 
illuminates the Court’s underlying rationale in retaliation cases 
generally, which I label the “Antiretaliation Principle.” The 
Antiretaliation Principle differs from other justifications for 
retaliation protection because it focuses on the notion that protecting 
employees from retaliation will enhance the enforcement of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
his professional duties). 
4 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Labor 
and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 283–84 (2009) (noting that the 
Roberts Court has issued several decisions undercutting an employee’s ability to bring 
employment discrimination claims in federal court); Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination 
While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 983 
(2007) (“In employment discrimination, it is as if there are two Supreme Courts issuing 
conflicting rulings.”); Anita Silvers et al., Disability and Employment Discrimination at the 
Rehnquist Court, 75 MISS. L.J. 945, 946 (2006) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court[ had a] general pattern 
of favoring plaintiffs in race and sex-based employment discrimination cases, while being 
decidedly pro-defendant in the parallel context of disability-related claims.”); Jonathan R. 
Harkavy, Supreme Court of the United States Employment Law Commentary 2007 Term, at 2 
(Oct. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1282160 (noting that although employees “won” more cases than they lost in 
2007, there was no “discernable shift in the Court’s orientation as an employer-friendly 
forum”); Marcia Coyle, Term’s Five Key Bias Decisions Were Mixed, NAT’L L.J. (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431973694&Terms_five_key_bias_deci
sions_were_mixed_&slreturn=1 (quoting Professor Paul Secunda’s statement that “[t]his Court 
tilts substantially towards pro-employer interests” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As 
Professor Scott Moss has noted, even though the Court has issued some rulings protecting 
employees in discrimination cases, the Court’s “anti-litigation” policies “significantly harm” the 
Court’s commitment to fighting discrimination. Moss, supra, at 986; see also Harkavy, supra, at 
37 (“[T]he unspoken, yet unmistakably apparent, agenda of the new majority is enhancement of 
employer prerogatives, recently focusing on protection of the at-will doctrine.”). 
5 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426 (“We reject . . . the notion that the First Amendment 
shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties.”). 
6 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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nation’s laws.7 Moreover, it both explains the recent Supreme Court 
cases and provides a reasoned and consistent standard against which 
they can be evaluated. Importantly, the Court’s use of the Principle 
also offers guidance for the way courts ought to approach the issue of 
employer retaliation in the future. 
Part I of the Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court 
historically has approached retaliation cases differently than typical 
employment matters. In employment cases, the Court often balances 
the employer’s interests against the employee’s interests.8 In 
retaliation cases, however, the Supreme Court uses the Antiretaliation 
Principle to also consider society’s interest in effective enforcement 
of the laws—an interest the Court believes can be advanced through 
strong antiretaliation protection for employees.9 For the past fifty 
years, the Court applied this Principle consistently in statutory 
                                                                                                                 
7 Commentators have provided numerous other rationales for antiretaliation protection. 
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405, 1434–35 (1967) (arguing 
that courts should adopt a tort of “abusive discharge” based on a fairness principle that 
employees are economically dependent on employers); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 18, 21–22 (2005) (asserting that retaliation protection is another form of statutory 
prohibition on discrimination); Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 
245–46 (2009) (arguing that retaliation protection should be provided to “citizen employees” 
who act in the public interest); Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for 
Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (1996) (“[T]he search for third-party effects is 
the driving force behind the tort [of wrongful discharge].”); ROBERT G. VAUGHN, HOW 
DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION INFLUENCE THE CHARACTER OF 
LEGAL STANDARDS (2006), www.corrupcion.unam.mx/documentos/ponencias/C_Vaughn.pdf 
(describing four separate justifications for protecting whistleblowers).  
8 See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (noting that a 
“main principle” in the Court’s public employment cases is that “although government 
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights 
must be balanced against the realities of the employment context”); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–809 (1998) (balancing various employer and employee interests in 
creating vicarious liability rules for supervisors under Title VII, but also providing for employer 
affirmative defenses); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206–07 (1991) (narrowly 
interpreting Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification defense using a test that balances 
only an employee’s rights against an employer’s business needs, and finding that the interests of 
a pregnant worker’s unborn children are not business needs); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting that Title VII strikes a “delicate balance between 
employee and employer rights”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing Title VII’s “balance between employee rights and employer 
prerogatives”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719–20 (1987) (“In the case of searches 
conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate 
expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient 
operation of the workplace.”); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797–98 (1945) 
(approving the NLRB’s balance “between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to 
employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain 
discipline in their establishments”); cf. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(5)(A), 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s 
disability against any undue hardship to the employer). 
9 See discussion infra Part I. 
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retaliation cases, but taken a slightly more cautious approach in First 
Amendment cases.  
Prior to this Article, the Supreme Court’s extensive case law 
regarding retaliation had never been examined through the organizing 
lens of the Antiretaliation Principle. Rather, commentators often 
examine these cases in isolation, through principles developed for the 
specific statute or constitutional provision under which the retaliation 
claim arose. For example, commentators examine retaliation cases as 
involving discrete subject matters such as discrimination,10 the First 
Amendment,11 or preemption.12 Part I of the Article steps back from 
the “trees” of individual substantive issues and explains the “forest” 
of retaliation cases. 
Part II examines how the Court relied on the Antiretaliation 
Principle, both explicitly and implicitly, in the six recent retaliation 
cases. Ultimately, the Principle explains the Court’s current 
retaliation jurisprudence and provides a principled way to evaluate the 
Court’s decisions: do these decisions advance the Court’s own 
Antiretaliation Principle by enhancing the enforcement of law? As 
this Part explains, in the recent statutory cases, the Court furthered the 
Antiretaliation Principle by privileging it over other norms that many 
would have thought sacrosanct to this Court. By contrast, although 
the lone constitutional case explicitly references the Antiretaliation 
Principle, the rule adopted by the Court in Garcetti likely will 
undermine society’s interest in law enforcement. 
Identifying and explaining the Court’s reliance on the 
Antiretaliation Principle has significant ramifications for the future of 
retaliation law, which I discuss in Part III. First, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in two cases for the 2010–11 Term that will test the 
boundaries of the Antiretaliation Principle. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp.,13 the Court will examine whether the 
Fair Labor Standards Act’s antiretaliation provision protects 
employees who file oral as well as written complaints.14 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
10 See, e.g., Brake, supra note 7, at 21–22 (examining retaliation as a part of 
discrimination law). 
11 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1102–07 (2008) (examining First Amendment protection for federal 
employees). 
12 See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge 
in the Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D. 
L. REV. 63, 89–98 (1989) (examining the Supreme Court’s analysis of federal preemption of 
state wrongful-discharge claims under the Labor Management Relations Act). 
13 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010). 
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
No. 09-834 (Jan. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 146471. 
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Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP15 presents the issue of 
whether Title VII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer 
from retaliating against a third party who is associated with an 
employee who engaged in protected conduct.16 The Court could use 
the Antiretaliation Principle to broaden antiretaliation protections 
under these statutes, despite arguments that the statutory language at 
issue in each case seemingly excludes the employees’ claims.17 
Second, respecting the Court’s view of the Antiretaliation 
Principle should cause lower courts to evaluate retaliation cases 
through this same lens. This perspective might impact a number of 
retaliation issues currently percolating. For example, courts have been 
struggling with the level of causation required by various retaliation 
statutes,18 and the Antiretaliation Principle can help provide some 
guidance on this complicated issue.19 Further, a focus on law 
enforcement would help courts interpret when a whistleblowing 
employee has a “reasonable belief” that an employer has violated the 
law, an issue that lower courts often have used to undermine statutory 
protection from retaliation.20 
I. THE PAST: THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE 
During the last fifty years of its retaliation jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that employees must be protected from 
retaliation in order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and 
criminal laws. This “Antiretaliation Principle” allows the Court to 
examine antiretaliation protection as a law-enforcement tool that 
benefits society, rather than simply as extra protection for employees 
provided at a cost to employers. The Court makes three assumptions 
throughout its opinions to support the Principle: (1) employees are in 
the best position to know about illegal conduct by their employer or 
other employees; (2) employees will report this information if the law 
protects them from employer retaliation; and (3) employee reports 
about misconduct will improve law enforcement.  
                                                                                                                 
15 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). 
16 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291 
(Sept. 3, 2009), 2010 WL 3501186. 
17 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
18 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
19 A recent nonretaliation Supreme Court case, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 
S. Ct. 2343 (2009), which dealt with the appropriate level of causation under the discrimination 
provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, will complicate this struggle. See id. at 
2350 (“To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA . . . a 
plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”). 
20 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE 381 
Significantly, the Court has applied the Principle in statutory cases 
differently than it has in First Amendment retaliation cases. In 
statutory cases, the Court broadly interpreted explicit antiretaliation 
provisions and implied antiretaliation protections even when no 
specific provision existed. The Court’s First Amendment retaliation 
jurisprudence, however, provides an outer limit of the Principle. 
Although the Court recognized the Antiretaliation Principle’s 
importance in these cases, the Court also suggested that statutes, 
rather than the Constitution, might be the better source for 
antiretaliation protection. 
A. Statutory Protection 
Professor Clyde Summers once noted that labor law’s purpose has 
always been to address the imbalance in bargaining power between 
employees and employers.21 From this perspective, statutory and 
judicial employment protections exist to protect employees’ 
“primarily non-economic interests in fairness, personal dignity, 
privacy, and physical integrity.”22 These legal protections must be 
balanced against the employer’s countervailing interest in the 
flexibility and efficiency provided by the at-will-employment rule.23 
In nonretaliation labor-and-employment cases, the Supreme Court has 
recognized this balancing of legal protection for employees against 
the economic burden that protection places on employers.24 
Particularly in recent years, however, that balance seems to be 
weighted towards employer interests in many nonretaliation 
decisions.25 
                                                                                                                 
21 Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 
NEB. L. REV. 7, 7 (1988). 
22 Id. at 15. 
23 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability 
against any undue hardship to the employer); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at 
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951–69 (1984) (describing the efficiency of the at-will-
employment rule).  
24 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting that 
Title VII strikes a “delicate balance between employee and employer rights”); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing how Title VII balances 
“employee rights and employer prerogatives” by eliminating “certain bases for distinguishing 
among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of choice”); see also supra 
note 8 (citing cases that discuss Title VII balancing). 
25 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65 (2009) (prohibiting employers 
from engaging in affirmative action in most circumstances, even if the affirmative-action 
policies were promulgated to avoid disparate-impact lawsuits); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (requiring that plaintiffs who bring disparate-treatment claims 
under the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, but-for causation); Engquist 
v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156–57 (2008) (limiting the ability of public 
employees to invoke the Equal Protection Clause in certain employment discrimination claims); 
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By contrast, the Court’s use of the Antiretaliation Principle in 
statutory retaliation cases typically has led to enhanced employee 
protection as compared to other types of employment-law cases. In 
these retaliation cases, the Court often utilized the Antiretaliation 
Principle’s “law enforcement” perspective to weigh a third interest: 
the interest of society in having the law enforced. As described below, 
the Court placed great weight on this societal interest because, in the 
Court’s formulation, protecting employees from retaliation increases 
employees’ willingness to provide information about illegal activity, 
which in turn advances societal law-enforcement goals. 
Several cases that demonstrate the Court’s use of the 
Antiretaliation Principle involved statutes lacking explicit legislative 
history regarding the purpose of antiretaliation legislation. This 
legislative silence often required the Supreme Court to explicate this 
purpose by utilizing the Antiretaliation Principle to justify a broad 
reading of a statutory antiretaliation provision.26 For example, in the 
Court’s first modern case involving a statutory antiretaliation 
provision, Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,27 the Court 
examined section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2175–78 (2007) (limiting the statute 
of limitations for Title VII discrimination cases), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) (“The 
limitation imposed by the Court [in Ledbetter] on the filing of discriminatory compensation 
claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust application of 
the civil rights laws that Congress intended.”). 
26 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the rare exception, and even that 
legislative history is sparse. Congress included an antiretaliation provision in the NLRA, one of 
the first employment statutes it enacted, to protect employees who had “filed charges or given 
testimony” related to a violation of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006); see also STEPHEN 
M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 93 (2001) (“Among the 
oldest statutes that protect employees (and supervisors) who engage in protected conduct, which 
under some circumstances can be classified as whistleblowing, is the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).” (footnote omitted)). Congress adopted this antiretaliation language from an 
earlier executive order issued under a predecessor statute explicitly so that employees would 
feel free to file charges when an employer violated the NLRA’s substantive provisions. See 79 
CONG. REC. S7676 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert Wagner) (noting that without an NLRA 
antiretaliation provision “even though there might be flagrant violations of the provisions of this 
measure, an employee would not be free to file charges. He would know that the moment the 
charges were filed he would be discharged.”); Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary, Labor Law by 
Boz—A Theory of Meyers Industries, Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Bird Engineering, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 155, 171 (1985) (noting that Congress relied on Executive Order 6711 when it 
adopted “the antiretaliation provision in the enumeration of unfair labor practices under the 
[NLRA]”). 
27 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Twenty-three years before Robert DeMario Jewelry, the Supreme 
Court upheld a provision of the NLRA that prevented another form of retaliation. In NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1937), the Court upheld section 8 of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1934), which prohibits employers from engaging in unfair labor 
practices, such as interfering with employees who exercise their NLRA rights and 
discriminating against employees to discourage union membership. 
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1938.28 This provision explicitly gave federal courts jurisdiction to 
enjoin violations of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision, but the case 
presented the question of whether the provision also permitted courts 
to order that an employer pay damages to employees who were 
retaliated against in violation of the Act.29 Although the FLSA 
seemed to limit courts’ powers to only injunctive relief,30 the 
Supreme Court held that the judiciary’s implicit, equitable powers in 
injunction cases included the power “to provide complete relief in the 
light of the statutory purposes,” including awarding back pay 
damages.31 The Court based its holding explicitly on the 
Antiretaliation Principle: 
[Congress] chose to rely on information and complaints 
received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed 
to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus 
only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials 
with their grievances. This end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) 
against discharges and other discriminatory practices was 
designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear 
of economic retaliation might often operate to induce 
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard 
conditions. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in 
§ 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by the Secretary 
pursuant to § 17, Congress sought to foster a climate in which 
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would 
be enhanced. 
In this context, the significance of reimbursement of lost wages 
becomes apparent. To an employee considering an attempt to secure 
his just wage deserts [sic] under the Act, the value of such an effort 
may pale when set against the prospect of discharge and the total loss 
of wages for the indeterminate period necessary to seek and obtain 
reinstatement. Resort to statutory remedies might thus often take on 
the character of a calculated risk, with restitution of partial 
deficiencies in wages due for past work perhaps obtainable only at the 
cost of irremediable entire loss of pay for an unpredictable period. 
                                                                                                                 
28 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1958). 
29 Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 289. 
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1952) (giving the district courts jurisdiction, “for cause shown,” to 
restrain violations of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision, provided that “no court shall have 
jurisdiction, in any action brought by the Secretary of Labor to restrain such violations, to order 
the payment to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages in such action”). 
31 Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 292. 
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Faced with such alternatives, employees understandably might decide 
that matters had best be left as they are. We cannot read the Act as 
presenting those it sought to protect with what is little more than a 
Hobson’s choice.32 
Thus, in Robert DeMario Jewlery, the Court broadly interpreted a 
statutory antiretaliation provision because it recognized that 
employees needed strong remedies to encourage them to come 
forward with information about violations of the law. Moreover, the 
Court asserted that Congress specifically intended for employee 
information to play a role in the statute’s enforcement scheme. 
After Robert DeMario Jewelry, the Court consistently wove 
language supporting the Antiretaliation Principle into its 
interpretations of statutory antiretaliation protections. In NLRB v. 
Scrivener,33 the first Supreme Court case to use the term “retaliatory 
discharge,”34 the Court found that the National Labor Relations Act 
protected employees who gave sworn statements to a National Labor 
Relations Board field examiner, even though the part of the Act’s 
antiretaliation provision at issue seemed to limit its protections to 
employees who file formal charges or testify at a formal hearing.35 
Limiting the statute’s protections to a narrow reading of the 
provision’s text, according to the Court, would undermine the Act’s 
purpose of encouraging “all persons with information about [unfair 
labor] practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting 
them to the Board.”36 Employees need “complete freedom” to report 
in order “to prevent the Board’s channels of information from being 
dried up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and 
witnesses.”37 Yet again, the Court acknowledged the important role of 
employee information in enforcing the law. 
Scrivener began a series of cases in which the Court found that 
express antiretaliation statutory provisions should be interpreted 
                                                                                                                 
32 Id. at 292–93 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
33 405 U.S. 117 (1972). 
34 See Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 408 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, 
C.J., dissenting in part) (citing Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117). 
35 Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 125 (“We therefore conclude that an employer’s discharge of an 
employee because the employee gave a written sworn statement to a Board field examiner 
investigating an unfair labor practice charge filed against the employer constitutes a violation of 
§ 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act.”). In Scrivener, the Court interpreted section 
8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which provides that an employer may not “discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this 
[Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006).  
36 Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 121 (quoting Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
37 Id. at 122 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. 
Cir. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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broadly to support the Antiretaliation Principle.38 For example, in 
Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,39 the Court recognized the 
importance of employee reports to detect illegal safety violations in 
the transportation industry40 and upheld a statutory scheme that 
permitted an administrative agency to temporarily reinstate a fired 
whistleblower because “the eventual recovery of backpay may not 
alone provide sufficient protection to encourage reports of safety 
violations.”41 Mirroring the “Hobson’s choice” language from Robert 
DeMario Jewelry,42 the Roadway Express Court accepted Congress’ 
rationale for the whistleblower protections: 
Section 405 was enacted in 1983 to encourage employee 
reporting of noncompliance with safety regulations governing 
commercial motor vehicles. Congress recognized that 
employees in the transportation industry are often best able 
to detect safety violations and yet, because they may be 
threatened with discharge for cooperating with enforcement 
agencies, they need express protection against retaliation for 
reporting these violations. . . . 
Congress also recognized that the employee’s protection 
against having to choose between operating an unsafe vehicle 
and losing his job would lack practical effectiveness if the 
employee could not be reinstated pending complete review. 
The longer a discharged employee remains unemployed, the 
more devastating are the consequences to his personal 
financial condition and prospects for reemployment. Ensuring 
the eventual recovery of backpay may not alone provide 
sufficient protection to encourage reports of safety violations. 
Accordingly, § 405 incorporates additional protections, 
authorizing temporary reinstatement based on a preliminary 
finding of reasonable cause to believe that the employee has 
suffered a retaliatory discharge.43  
Similarly, the Court paid particularly close attention to the role 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision plays in enforcing that law and 
advancing the Act’s goals, even though Title VII’s legislative history 
                                                                                                                 
38 See id. (“[Section 8(a)(4)] can also be read more broadly. . . . This broad interpretation 
of § 8(a)(4) accords with the Labor Board’s view entertained for more than 35 years.”). 
39 481 U.S. 252 (1987). 
40 Id. at 258. 
 
41 Id. at 259. 
42 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1959). 
43 Roadway Express, 481 U.S. at 258–59 (emphasis added). 
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contains little insight into the purposes of its antiretaliation provision. 
The primary purpose of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, 
according to the Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,44 is to help 
enforce the law by “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”45 In Robinson, the Court examined whether 
Title VII protected former employees from retaliation.46 The Court 
admitted that, “at first blush,” Title VII’s plain statutory language 
excluded former employees from protection because it applies only to 
“employees,” which “would seem to refer to those having an existing 
employment relationship with the employer in question.”47 Yet, after 
scrutinizing the term in other parts of Title VII, the Court determined 
that its meaning was “ambiguous.”48 To resolve this ambiguity, the 
Court relied on the Antiretaliation Principle, holding that former 
employees should be protected from retaliation because the Court did 
not want to “undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the 
threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of 
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC.”49  
The Court also applied the Antiretaliation Principle by permitting a 
statutory retaliation claim to proceed even though the statute at issue 
did not contain any antiretaliation language. In Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc.,50 the Court held that a statutory antidiscrimination 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, contained an implied cause of action for 
retaliation.51 Section 1982 still provides that “[a]ll citizens of the 
United States shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property.”52 Despite the clear absence of any explicit 
protection from retaliation in the statutory language, the Sullivan 
Court upheld a retaliation claim by a white landowner who was 
retaliated against for leasing a house to a black man.53 The Court 
concluded that, if an individual could be “punished for trying to 
vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982,” then “[s]uch a 
                                                                                                                 
44 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
45 Id. at 346. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 341. 
48 Id. at 343–44 (“Once it is established that the term ‘employees’ includes former 
employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous 
and each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further 
meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.”). 
49 Id. at 346. 
50 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
51 Id. at 237 (“A narrow construction of language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent 
with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, from which § 1982 was derived.”). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). 
53 See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234–35, 237. 
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sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions 
on property.”54 In other words, the Court found that enforcing § 1982 
meant providing additional protection from retaliation, even if the 
statute itself did not contain any explicit antiretaliation protection.  
The outcomes of retaliation cases also demonstrate the Court’s 
recognition of the Antiretaliation Principle’s importance, as much as 
the opinions’ language, particularly in statutory cases. For example, 
during the last fifty years, the Court interpreted statutes to allow a 
broad range of individuals to bring retaliation claims, including third 
parties who report statutory violations,55 former employees,56 at-will 
employees,57 elected union officials against their union,58 and illegal 
aliens.59 Moreover, the Court indicated that these statutes provide a 
wide range of remedies60 to victims of a wide range of retaliatory 
actions by employers.61 Significantly, the Court also recognized the 
importance of state retaliation remedies by not permitting federal 
statutory schemes with weak retaliation remedies to impliedly 
preempt potentially stronger state tort claims based on an employer’s 
retaliation.62  
                                                                                                                 
54 Id. at 237. 
55 See id. (holding that a third party enjoyed retaliation protection when reporting 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 violations). 
56 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former 
employees were protected under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision). 
57 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(2), which prevents “intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court 
proceedings,” includes protection for at-will employees). 
58 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (interpreting 
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959). 
59 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984) (holding that an employer’s 
reporting of undocumented alien employees to law enforcement authorities was an unfair labor 
practice under the National Labor Relations Act when done in retaliation for the employees’ 
participation in union activities). 
60 See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1987) (approving the 
Department of Labor’s decision to order temporary reinstatement with backpay as a remedy for 
retaliation); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960) (finding that 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 gave courts the power to award backpay damages in 
addition to ordering injunctive relief). But see Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 902–05 (restricting the 
backpay and reinstatement remedies for illegal aliens). 
61 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (holding that 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision applies outside of the workplace and prohibits any employer 
action that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination”); Haddle, 525 U.S. at 125–27 (prohibiting employers from firing at-will 
employees in retaliation for their testifying in federal proceedings); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) (allowing courts to enjoin employers from prosecuting 
“baseless” lawsuits that are designed to retaliate against employees who are exercising their 
rights under the National Labor Relations Act). 
62 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (holding that the 
Railway Labor Act does not preempt state wrongful-discharge torts); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (holding that section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act does not 
preempt an employee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Lingle v. Norge Div. 
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A few counterexamples exist in which the Court did not recognize 
the Antiretaliation Principle and its primary goal of protecting 
society’s interest in law enforcement. Instead, the Court utilized its 
typical “employment law” focus and concentrated only on balancing 
the interests of employers and employees. Clark County School 
District v. Breeden63 presents an example of this type of case. In 
Breeden, the plaintiff alleged that she had been retaliated against for 
complaining about alleged sexual harassment and for filing a lawsuit 
based on that complaint.64 In the case’s primary holding, the Supreme 
Court found in favor of the employer because the plaintiff did not 
engage in protected activity.65 According to the Court, “no reasonable 
person” could have believed that the alleged sexual harassment about 
which the plaintiff complained violated Title VII because the conduct 
in question was a single instance of behavior that could not have 
violated the law.66 After Breeden, courts consistently adopted the 
standard that an employee must have a “reasonable belief” in the 
illegality of an employer’s action in order to be protected from 
retaliation.67 
As applied by the Court in Breeden, this standard may not fully 
advance the goals of the Antiretaliation Principle. Indeed, the Breeden 
Court never mentioned the importance of retaliation protection for 
enforcing Title VII. Instead, the Court cited almost exclusively to its 
sexual-harassment jurisprudence to demonstrate that the activity 
about which the plaintiff complained could not be considered sexual 
harassment, because it was a single incident that was not “extremely 
                                                                                                                 
 
of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1988) (holding that section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 did not preempt an employee’s state tort remedy for 
wrongful discharge). But see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) 
(holding that section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 expressly 
preempted employees’ state common-law claims of wrongful discharge). 
63 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
64 Id. at 269–70. 
65 Id. at 270–73. 
66 Id. at 271. The Court also found that the plaintiff could not prove causation—that any 
protected activity caused an adverse employment action. Id. at 272–73. In doing so, the Court 
relied exclusively on various factual showings regarding the timing of the alleged protected 
activity and the adverse action. The Court did not discuss, or even mention, the appropriate legal 
standard for causation in a retaliation case, nor did the Court attempt to explain any policy 
rationale for its decision. Id. 
67 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the 
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007) (stating that after Breeden, all of 
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted the objectively reasonable standard when 
adjudicating Title VII antiretaliation cases). Courts also use the “reasonable belief” standard for 
other statutes, such as Title IX and Title VI, even though the origin of the objectively reasonable 
standard is rooted in Title VII’s unique statutory language. See Brake, supra note 7, at 83. 
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serious.”68 This sexual-harassment jurisprudence requires “severe or 
pervasive” employer action that alters the terms and conditions of 
employment,69 a standard derived from the Court’s previous 
balancing of employer and employee interests.70 Unlike the other 
retaliation cases mentioned above, the Breeden Court never discussed 
whether its holding would promote better compliance with the law.71  
To be fair, though, the “reasonable belief” standard adopted by the 
Court seems more generous to employees than requiring the 
employee to report an actual illegality. This alternate course is 
supported by Title VII’s language, which provides protection only if 
an employee opposes employment practices that are “made an 
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII.]”72 In other words, the 
Court could have justified a standard requiring the reporting 
employee to prove actual employer illegality, instead of only a 
reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct was illegal.73 Moreover, 
several “employee friendly” retaliation statutes have explicitly 
adopted the “reasonable belief” standard articulated in Breeden, and 
many would consider that to be a sensible requirement for protection 
from retaliation, assuming the standard is appropriately applied.74 In 
Breeden, however, the Court adopted this standard without examining 
                                                                                                                 
68 See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71 (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 
(1998)); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 
(1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
69 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.  
70 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–808 (balancing various employer and employee 
interests to create a rule that makes an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s actionable 
discrimination, while still providing the employer with affirmative defenses); Onacle, 523 U.S. 
at 82 (asserting that same-sex sexual-harassment claims would not eviscerate Title VII because 
“[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries 
to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and 
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or 
abusive”); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (noting that the Court’s Title VII sexual-harassment standard 
“takes a middle path”). 
71 Breeden likely does not represent a serious deviation from the Antiretaliation Principle. 
One group of commentators believe that Breeden “may simply be a case of unsympathetic 
plaintiffs making ‘bad law,’” rather than a “signal [of] the Supreme Court’s hostility to 
retaliation cases in general.” MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 160 (3d ed. 
2005). 
72 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); see also Rosenthal, 
supra note 67, at 1133 (“[T]he statutory language indicates that the activity the employee 
opposes must violate Title VII . . . .”). 
73 See, e.g., EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975) 
(requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer had engaged in an unlawful act under Title 
VII); Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1140–41 (“[T]he Court’s language [in Breeden] suggested 
that perhaps it would require an actual [Title VII] violation, as the statute’s language requires.”). 
74 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 § 219, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2087(a)(1) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a)(1) (2006); see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
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its effect on the goal of antiretaliation protection: to increase 
compliance with the law. Moreover, the application of the standard in 
Breeden may have encouraged subsequent courts to place themselves 
in the position of the employee and assume too much legal 
knowledge, thereby inappropriately scrutinizing the employee’s 
whistleblowing complaint.75 In Part III, this Article addresses how the 
Antiretaliation Principle could better inform the application of 
Breeden’s reasonable person standard. 
The Court also has read other statutory antiretaliation provisions 
more narrowly than the Antiretaliation Principle might have required. 
In Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson (Graham County I),76 for example, the Court 
held that the statute of limitations for the retaliation provision of the 
False Claims Act77 (“FCA”) should be based on the most closely 
analogous state limitations period, rather than the (likely longer) six-
year statute of limitations that applies to the other provisions of the 
Act.78  
The Court recognized that the limitations provision was 
“ambiguous,” but ignored the Antiretaliation Principle.79 Instead, the 
Court based its holding on the application of several different 
principles of statutory construction rather than a consideration of 
whether various statutes of limitations would encourage or discourage 
employees to report illegal conduct.80 As the dissent noted, the 
Court’s holding might undermine the Antiretaliation Principle by 
leaving some whistleblowers at the mercy of state statutes of 
limitations that likely are shorter than the FCA’s six-year limitations 
period.81 Privileging the Antiretaliation Principle over other canons of 
statutory construction, as the Court did in the five recent statutory 
retaliation cases,82 could have led to stronger retaliation protection—
the outcome advocated by the dissent.83 
                                                                                                                 
75 See discussion infra Part III.B (providing examples of lower courts inappropriately 
applying Breeden’s reasonable-belief standard). 
76 545 U.S. 409 (2005). 
77 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006). 
78 Graham Cnty. I, 545 U.S. at 422. 
79 Id. at 415–17. 
80 Id. at 418–19. 
81 See id. at 427–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
82 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
83 See Graham Cnty. I, 545 U.S. at 427–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would read the 
statute to do what the statute says Congress wanted: to provide a relatively long, single, uniform 
limitations period that, in practice, seems to protect the many real potential plaintiffs, such as 
relator, who will otherwise find themselves shut out of court.”). Similarly, in Saudi Arabia v. 
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), the Court narrowly read the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to 
exclude a whistleblower’s retaliation claim. However, the Court never examined or mentioned 
the Antiretaliation Principle. Id. at 362–63. Instead of focusing on whistleblower issues, the 
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More recently, the Court undermined qui tam whistleblower rights 
under the False Claims Act by finding that whistleblowers could not 
rely on disclosures made in state and local administrative reports.84 
Although Graham County II did not address the FCA’s retaliation 
provision, it likely will reduce the number of whistleblowers 
potentially protected from retaliation simply because it narrows the 
scope of an employee’s “protected activity” that triggers 
antiretaliation protection.85 That said, the Court’s opinion focused 
more on the balancing necessary in a qui tam case, rather than on the 
balancing retaliation cases require.86 Moreover, even in Graham 
County II, the Court actually reinforced the core law-enforcement 
tenet of the Antiretaliation Principle. The Court defended its holding 
by noting that it would not give state and local governments a way to 
immunize themselves from a qui tam lawsuit, which would increase 
illegal fraud.87 If state and local governments disclosed fraud in an 
administrative report, then the United States and the “most deserving” 
whistleblowers could still bring a qui tam action to ensure the law is 
enforced.88  
Taken together, these few “limiting” cases may nibble around the 
edges of the Antiretaliation Principle. They do not, however, 
undermine the Principle’s power when explaining the balance of 
Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence and its broad recognition of 
the importance of antiretaliation protection. During the last fifty 
years, the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence involving statutory cases 
sends a clear message: employees play an important role in enforcing 
                                                                                                                 
 
Court’s analysis focused on whether the alleged retaliatory action was “commercial” or 
conducted pursuant to the police power of a foreign sovereign nation. Id. at 360–63.  
84 See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson 
(Graham County II), 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2010) (“The question before us is whether the 
reference to ‘administrative’ reports, audits, and investigations in that provision encompasses 
disclosures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources. We hold that it does.”). 
85 See, e.g., McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp. 2d 672, 685–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(finding that the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by filing a qui tam action because 
his complaint was based on publicly available information, and, therefore, was not “in 
furtherance” of an action under the False Claims Act, as required by the FCA’s retaliation 
provision). 
86 The Court described the goal of the qui tam provision as “[s]eeking the golden mean 
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information 
and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute 
of their own.” Graham County II, 130 S. Ct. at 1406 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield 
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
87 Id. at 1410–11. 
88 Id. at 1410. The Court identified whistleblowers who were the original source of the 
information about the fraud as the “most deserving” whistleblowers who would not be hurt by 
the rule. Id. 
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statutory laws and the Court will provide employees broad protection 
from retaliation in order to enhance enforcement of those laws. 
B. First Amendment Protection 
The Court’s First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence provides a 
slightly more nuanced application of the Antiretaliation Principle. 
Although the Antiretaliation Principle informs the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding First Amendment protections for government 
employees who disclose illegal conduct, it does not drive the 
decisions in the same way as with statutory claims.  
Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education,89 the Court has 
held that the First Amendment can prohibit the government from 
retaliating against employees who speak out as citizens regarding 
matters of public concern.90 As recently put by the Court, “So long as 
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, 
they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for 
their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”91 This “public 
concern” test provides potentially broader protection than the 
Antiretaliation Principle’s “law enforcement” focus because protected 
employee speech may involve a matter of public concern, but not any 
violation of the law.92 As a result, the Court’s incorporation of the 
Principle in its First Amendment case law requires a more nuanced 
examination of the cases. 
First, in accordance with the Antiretaliation Principle, the Court 
repeatedly has emphasized that the First Amendment must protect 
government employees because these employees often have 
knowledge the public would want to know about government 
operations. For example, in the seminal Pickering case, the Court 
prohibited a school district from discharging a teacher for his public 
comments about school funding.93 The Court protected the teacher 
from retaliation, in part, because 
                                                                                                                 
89 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
90 See id. at 568 (“To the extent that the [lower court’s] opinion may be read to suggest 
that [employees] may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights 
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection 
with the operation of [their workplaces], it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally 
rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.”). 
91 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).  
92 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (holding that the First Amendment protected a teacher 
who spoke about school budget issues from dismissal because the topic was a matter of public 
concern). 
93 See id. (“[A] teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may 
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”). 
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[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community most 
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds 
allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. 
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out 
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory 
dismissal.94  
Similarly, in Waters v. Churchill,95 the Court recognized that 
“[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what 
ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much 
from their informed opinions.”96 The Court’s use of the 
Antiretaliation Principle in First Amendment cases recognizes 
employees’ special knowledge and protects them from retaliation in 
order to encourage their disclosure of this information.  
Second, the Court’s First Amendment test considers not just the 
balance between the employee and employer’s rights, but also 
requires that courts balance society’s right to information as well. For 
example, in Pickering, the Court upheld a First Amendment 
retaliation claim to protect the “public interest in having free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”97 In later cases, 
the Court expressed concern for retaliation protection in this area 
because the fear of discharge could “chill” employee participation in 
public affairs, which would damage larger societal interests.98 The 
Court’s most explicit articulation of this came in City of San Diego v. 
Roe99: 
                                                                                                                 
94 Id. at 572; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (noting that many other categories of 
public employees also have informed and definite opinions about issues related to their job). 
95 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
96 Id. at 674 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 
U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that public employees have “informed opinions on 
important public issues”). 
97 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. 
98 See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Waubaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 
674 (1996) (noting that an independent contractor relationship with the government “provides a 
valuable financial benefit, the threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill 
speech on matters of public concern by those who, because of their dealings with the 
government, ‘are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work’” 
(quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 674)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144–45 (1983) (“In all of 
these cases, the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions 
sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. The issue was 
whether government employees could be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of discharge from 
joining political parties and other associations that certain public officials might find 
‘subversive.’”); cf. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (noting 
the “chilling effect” speech-based retaliation had on nongovernment employees, which the “free 
speech” provision of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act aimed to prevent). 
99 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). 
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Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that 
public employees are often the members of the community 
who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations 
of their public employers, operations which are of substantial 
concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these 
matters, the community would be deprived of informed 
opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as 
much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it 
is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.100  
The “public concern” doctrinal requirement acknowledges that more 
is at stake than simply the employer-employee relationship. The 
government is an employer, but it cannot restrict speech in which 
society might be interested. Consistent with the Antiretaliation 
Principle, this constitutional test differs from the Court’s typical focus 
in nonretaliation employment cases by considering society’s interest 
in protecting employees with important information. 
Third, the Court has recognized that much of this First 
Amendment–protected speech necessarily will relate to employee 
reports regarding violations of the law.101 In Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District,102 a teacher informed her principal in a 
series of private meetings that the school district’s policies were 
discriminatory.103 Because Givhan concerned the expression of 
opinion in private settings, the Court did not discuss the plaintiff’s 
speech under the rubric of “public concern.” Several years later, 
however, in Connick v. Myers,104 the Court recognized that the subject 
matter of Givhan’s statements about illegality clearly involved a 
matter of public concern.105  
In Connick, the Court provided significant insight regarding its 
views on the First Amendment and retaliation. Specifically, the Court 
found that an employee’s behavior was, for the most part, not 
protected activity because the employee had not spoken on a matter of 
                                                                                                                 
100 Id. at 82 (citation omitted). 
101 By protecting speech related to a “public concern,” the Court certainly has a purpose 
broader than solely enhancing law enforcement—the Court encourages debate related to a wide 
range of topics. As described in the following text, however, protected topics of “public 
concern” often relate to employee reports of illegal conduct. 
102 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
103 Id. at 411–14. 
104 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
105 Id. at 146 (“Although the subject matter of Mrs. Givhan’s statements were [sic] not the 
issue before the Court, it is clear that her statements concerning the School District’s allegedly 
racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern.”); id. at 148 n.8 (noting that 
Givhan’s protest regarding the school’s racially discriminatory policy was “a matter inherently 
of public concern”). 
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public concern.106 The Court contrasted the nonprotected speech in 
Connick with examples of speech that would be protected, such as 
“bring[ing] to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach[ing the] 
public trust on the part of [other government employees].”107 Thus, 
although the “public concern” test is not solely about law 
enforcement, the Court certainly has supported the Antiretaliation 
Principle by providing First Amendment protection to government 
employees who bring illegalities to light.108 
Particularly in constitutional cases, the Principle does not mean 
that employees always win. In several constitutional cases after 
Pickering, the Court determined that the First Amendment did not 
protect the employee who brought a claim. None of these cases, 
however, involved an employee who claimed protection because the 
he or she identified illegal employer conduct. Instead, losing 
employees claimed protection based on speech unrelated to illegal 
conduct, including complaints about a school’s teacher dress code,109 
public statements criticizing a federal agency,110 criticisms of a public 
hospital’s nurse-staffing policy,111 and personnel matters.112  
Indeed, before Garcetti, whether the Court granted First 
Amendment protection to employee speech correlated precisely with 
                                                                                                                 
106 Id. at 147–49. 
107 Id. at 148. 
108 This conclusion must be tempered somewhat by the Court’s decision in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not 
protect an employee who reported misconduct if that report was made as part of the employee’s 
job duties. Id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and 
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). For a more 
detailed discussion of this case and explanation of this discrepancy, see infra Part II.B–C. 
109 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977) (concerning 
the petitioner’s divulgence of the substance of a dress code memorandum, which had been 
distributed by the principal to several teachers, to a local radio station). 
110 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 369 (1983) (“[Petitioner] made a number of public 
statements, including two televised interviews, that were highly critical of [NASA].”). 
111 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664–66 (1994) (plurality opinion). In Waters, 
the parties disputed the precise speech involved, but the Court found that even if the employee’s 
version was true, she had conducted the speech in a disruptive manner, thereby “outweigh[ing] 
whatever First Amendment value it might have had.” Id. at 680. 
112 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48 (1983) (concerning an employee who claimed 
protection for discussing workplace grievances). One part of Connick presents a tough question: 
Did the Court uphold a retaliatory discharge against a person who had reported illegal conduct? 
The answer to that question, most likely, is “no.” 
In Connick, the respondent had distributed a questionnaire to other employees, and the 
Court found that only one question involved a matter of public concern: whether employees 
ever felt pressure to work on political campaigns for candidates supported by the government 
employer. Id. at 149. The Court found that this question involved “coercion of belief in violation 
of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. The Court held, however, that the Pickering balancing 
of interests did not support permitting a constitutional retaliation claim because the 
“questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense.” Id. at 154. 
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whether the speech related to reports of illegality. An employee 
reported a violation of law in each of the only two cases since 
Pickering in which the Court upheld a First Amendment claim. In 
Givhan, the employee made an internal report about potential 
violations of discrimination laws.113 In Board of County 
Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr,114 the Court 
extended First Amendment protection to an independent contractor 
(as opposed to an employee) who made critical statements about a 
county government, including an accusation that the county had 
violated the law.115  
As with statutory violations, some of the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment decisions actually seem to undermine retaliation 
protection. For example, the Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle116 provides employers 
with an affirmative defense in First Amendment retaliation cases if 
the employer can demonstrate that it would have made the same 
employment decision, even in the absence of the employee’s 
protected conduct.117 Congress has subsequently adopted this 
affirmative defense in several whistleblower statutes118 and courts 
often incorporate it when construing other antiretaliation 
protections.119 Although this decision provides less protection to 
employees, it does not necessarily do so at the expense of the 
Principle. In fact, the Court implicitly considered the Principle when 
                                                                                                                 
113 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1979). 
114 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
115 See id. at 671 (“Umbehr spoke at the Board’s meetings, and wrote critical letters and 
editorials in local newspapers regarding the County’s landfill user rates, the cost of obtaining 
official documents from the County, alleged violations by the Board of the Kansas Open 
Meetings Act, the County’s alleged mismanagement of taxpayers’ money, and other topics.”). 
116 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
117 See id. at 287 (“Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent 
to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial 
factor’ . . . in the Board’s decision not to rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden, 
however, the District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s 
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.”). 
118 See, e.g., Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century 
§ 519, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (“Notwithstanding a finding by the Secretary that 
the complainant has made the showing required under clause (i), no investigation otherwise 
required under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted if the employer demonstrates, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action 
in the absence of that behavior.”); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2006) (adopting the legal burdens of proof in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). Unlike 
the standard set forth in Mt. Healthy, which requires only a “preponderance of the evidence” for 
a successful affirmative defense, these statutes require employers to prove this affirmative 
defense by “clear and convincing evidence.”  
119 See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 234–35 & n.42 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing how Mt. Healthy’s “but-
for” standard is applied in other cases involving different antiretaliation statutes). 
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it reached this result, finding that the “constitutional principle at stake 
is sufficiently vindicated” when employers are still able to make an 
employment decision based on an employee’s nonprotected 
conduct.120 According to the Court, for all of the good that 
government employees can do when they bring misconduct to public 
light, they should not be able to put themselves in a “better position” 
as a result of their disclosure than they would have been in had they 
remained silent.121 Consistent with the Antiretaliation Principle, 
government employees who engage in constitutionally protected 
speech will be protected in the first instance. Mt. Healthy affirms that 
Principle, even if it makes clear that protected speech will not 
inoculate an employee from disciplinary action based on other 
conduct.122  
Yet, despite incorporating and identifying aspects of the 
Antiretaliation Principle in its constitutional retaliation cases, the 
Court has indicated at least one substantive limit, even when 
employees report potential violations of the law: Statutes, not the 
Constitution, should drive the Principle.  
In Bush v. Lucas,123 the Court prohibited a federal employee from 
bringing a First Amendment retaliation case for damages against a 
supervisor.124 In that case, the Court recognized the Antiretaliation 
Principle, but thought that existing statutory protections under the 
Civil Service Reform Act sufficiently protected the Principle: “In the 
past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level 
Government employees are a valuable source of information, and that 
supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates’ 
freedom of expression.”125 Given the presence of the Civil Service 
Reform Act protections, the Court determined that it should not 
second-guess Congress’ conclusion regarding the extent to which the 
Principle should be protected.126  
                                                                                                                 
120 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285. 
121 See id. 
122 Of course, fact finders may have an extremely difficult time applying this standard in 
reality, as it requires a relatively difficult inquiry into employer motives. The point here is that 
the Court upheld the core tenet of the Principle, even as it was finding against a whistleblowing 
employee in this particular case. 
123 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
124 Id. at 385–90. The Court also noted that the administrative and judicial procedures 
already in place provided appropriate avenues to redress improper conduct and bring 
constitutional challenges against agency action. Id. Although the employee in Bush did not 
report a violation of the law, the Court’s holding is broad enough that it could prohibit 
constitutional damages even in the case of federal employees who report illegalities. Id. at 388–
90. 
125 Id. at 389. 
126 See id. (“In all events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the 
impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil 
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Thus, for the most part, prior to 2006 the Court’s First Amendment 
retaliation cases recognized and advanced the Antiretaliation 
Principle. Because society has an important interest in learning about 
the valuable information known by government employees, the 
Constitution protects government employees who reported violations 
of the law. The Court did, however, impose a limitation on the 
Principle based on the Court’s understanding that statutes, not the 
Constitution, should drive antiretaliation protection if statutes 
addressed the issue. 
II. THE PRESENT: SIX RETALIATION CASES IN FIVE YEARS 
The Supreme Court’s six recent retaliation cases build on this 
extensive jurisprudence and reflect the Court’s historical recognition 
of the Antiretaliation Principle. Five of these decisions explored the 
extent to which various federal statutes prohibited retaliation in the 
employment context. Three of these statutory cases involved implied 
protection from retaliation in three different statutes without an 
express antiretaliation provision.127 The other two analyzed the 
express antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.128  
As explained below, the Court provided broad retaliation 
protection in all five statutory cases, often with explicit reference to 
the Principle, despite traditional statutory interpretation and policy 
rationales that might support more narrow holdings. In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, the lone constitutional case among the six recent decisions, 
the Court explicitly recognized the Principle, but also continued its 
                                                                                                                 
 
service. Not only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with balancing governmental 
efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding 
procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts. Nor is there any reason to 
discount Congress’ ability to make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a 
new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing 
controversial views.”). 
127 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (recognizing implied 
protection from retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 
(2008) (recognizing implied protection from retaliation under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (recognizing 
implied protection from retaliation under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
128 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009) (holding that Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 retaliation protection extends to employees “who speak[] out about 
discrimination not on [their] own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s 
internal investigation”); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) 
(holding that the retaliation-protection provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
covers all employer actions “that would [be] materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job 
applicant”). 
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more limited view of retaliation protections in constitutional cases 
based on the Court’s preference for statutory coverage.129  
The first two Sections that follow briefly describe these six recent 
cases and summarize the Court’s decisions. The third Section 
analyzes the cases in light of the Court’s historic use of the 
Antiretaliation Principle. 
A. Statutory Protection 
Statutory antiretaliation protection can be either express or 
implied. Express provisions provide the most common form of 
protection: over thirty-five federal statutes contain an explicit 
provision protecting employees from retaliation for undertaking 
various protected activities.130 These statutes often detail the type of 
employees and employers covered by the provision, the type of 
activity in which employees must engage to be protected, and the type 
of remedy available to employees.131 More rarely, a court will find a 
statute that does not provide explicit protection nevertheless contains 
implicit antiretaliation safeguards.132 Because of a general judicial 
reluctance to imply statutory remedies, the Court upheld only one 
implied retaliation claim prior to 2005—Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, Inc.—and that case did not involve an employee.133 Beginning 
in 2005, however, the Court upheld implied retaliation claims by 
employees in three separate cases involving three separate statutes.  
1. Implied Retaliation Protection 
The first of these three cases, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education,134 involved a claim by a high-school teacher and 
basketball coach. The plaintiff claimed he had received negative 
evaluations and was fired from his coaching position because he 
complained that the girls’ basketball team was receiving unequal 
                                                                                                                 
129 See discussion infra Part II.B–C. 
130 See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119, at 319–20 (compiling statutes with 
express antiretaliation protections). 
131 See Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
975, 981–83 (2008) (discussing some of the types of employers and employees, as well as the 
types of conduct, protected by various federal antiretaliation provisions). 
132 See KOHN, supra note 26, at 87–88 (discussing the doctrine of “implied private cause of 
action” for establishing whistleblower protections in the absence of express statutory 
provisions). 
133 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that a white 
property owner had standing to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim after a homeowners’ association 
retaliated against him for leasing his house to a black man); see also discussion supra Part I.A. 
134 544 U.S. 167 (2005).  
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treatment.135 The plaintiff asserted his claim of retaliation under Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,136 which generally 
prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex” in federally funded 
education programs.137  
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title IX did not 
provide a private right of action for retaliation because the statutory 
language failed to include an express antiretaliation provision.138 By 
contrast, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed only eight 
years before Title IX, contains a very specific antiretaliation provision 
that serves as the model for many modern retaliation protections.139 
According to the Birmingham Board of Education, Title VII 
demonstrated that Congress knew how to write a specific 
antiretaliation provision.140 The Board further argued that the absence 
of such a specific provision in Title IX meant that Congress must 
have purposefully excluded retaliation protection from the statute.141  
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Board, reversed the Eleventh Circuit, and found an implied claim for 
retaliation in Title IX.142 The Court used three arguments to overcome 
the problem presented by Title IX’s silence regarding retaliation. 
First, the Court asserted that “discrimination” should be construed 
broadly to cover “a wide range of intentional unequal treatment.”143 In 
other words, the Court found that “retaliation is discrimination ‘on the 
                                                                                                                 
135 Id. at 171–72. 
136 Id. at 171. 
137 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).  
138 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002). The court 
of appeals also found that a Department of Education regulation prohibiting retaliation could not 
create, on its own, a private right of action. Id. at 1346. 
139 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under [Title VII].”). Other antidiscrimination statutes provide antiretaliation protection with 
similar provisions based on the language in Title VII. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (using language identical to Title 
VII to prohibit retaliation against employees who oppose age discrimination); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2006) (using language identical to Title VII 
to prohibit retaliation against individuals who oppose discrimination against disabled persons). 
140 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175 (noting that the Board urged the Court to compare Title 
IX with Title VII). 
141 Id.; see also id. at 189–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (comparing Title IX to Title VII’s 
explicit antiretaliation provision and asserting that the absence of a specific retaliation provision 
is “significant”).  
142 Id. at 171 (majority opinion). Justice O’Connor authored the majority opinion. Id. 
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia 
and Kennedy. Id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
143 Id. at 175 (majority opinion). 
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basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response to the nature of the 
complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.”144  
Second, in an interesting twist on the defendant’s argument 
regarding statutory silence, the Court noted that Title VII “is a vastly 
different statute from Title IX”145 because Title IX contains a general 
prohibition on discrimination, while Title VII provides very specific 
examples of conduct that constitutes unlawful discrimination.146 Thus, 
“[b]ecause Congress did not list any specific discriminatory practices 
when it wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice does 
not tell [the Court] anything about whether it intended that practice to 
be covered.”147  
Third, the Jackson Court relied on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 
Inc.,148 a thirty-six-year-old case, as precedent for interpreting a 
general prohibition on discrimination to include a claim for 
retaliation.149 Although Justice Thomas, in a dissent joined by three 
other Justices, claimed that Sullivan was a standing case that merely 
permitted the white property owner to assert the claim of the black 
tenant,150 the majority found that “Sullivan’s holding was not so 
limited.”151 Rather, for the Jackson majority, Sullivan “plainly held 
that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of action 
under § 1982 if he could show that he was ‘punished for trying to 
vindicate the rights of minorities.’”152 Because the Court viewed 
Sullivan’s holding as implying a claim of retaliation in a general 
discrimination statute, the Court found that Congress likely intended 
the same interpretation for Title IX, which was passed only three 
years after the Court decided Sullivan.153 Moreover, not only did the 
Court hold that Title IX includes an implied claim of retaliation, but it 
also relied on Sullivan to find that the retaliation claim protects both 
the original victims of discrimination as well as a third party (like 
Coach Jackson) who complains about the original discrimination.154 
As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, the majority had created “an 
                                                                                                                 
144 Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 175 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–84, 286–87 
(1998)). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 396 U.S. 229 (1969)). 
149 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176 (stating that because Congress enacted Title IX merely three 
years after Sullivan, that case provides a good context for interpreting the statute).  
150 Id. at 194–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 176 n.1 (majority opinion). 
152 Id. (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237).  
153 Id. at 176. 
154 Id. at 179–80.  
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entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights holder, beyond the 
claim of the original rights holder.”155 
In two cases decided in 2008, the Court returned to the issue 
presented by Jackson: whether a general antidiscrimination provision 
also provides an implied claim of retaliation. The first case, CBOCS 
West, Inc. v. Humphries,156 examined 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to determine 
if it “encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has 
complained about a violation of another person’s contract-related 
‘right.’”157 Like § 1982 in Sullivan and Title IX in Jackson, § 1981 
does not include an explicit antiretaliation provision; rather, the 
statute generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in 
“mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts.”158 Nevertheless, as in Sullivan 
and Jackson, the Supreme Court in CBOCS West found an implied 
claim of retaliation contained in this general language.159 
This time, unlike in Jackson, the Court did not debate the meaning 
of Sullivan or whether a general antidiscrimination statute could 
include specific protection from retaliation.160 Rather, the Court found 
that Jackson definitively resolved those issues and, therefore, the 
CBOCS West holding rested “in significant part upon principles of 
stare decisis.”161 The fact that the Court previously interpreted § 1981 
similarly to § 1982 (at issue in Sullivan) only added to the stare 
decisis rationale.162  
In some respects, CBOCS West represents even stronger support 
for implied-retaliation claims than Jackson. Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito joined the Court between the Jackson and CBOCS West 
decisions, which many commentators predicted would make the 
Court more employer oriented than the Jackson Court.163 Yet, despite 
                                                                                                                 
155 Id. at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
156 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008). 
157 Id. at 1954. The employee in CBOCS West was dismissed because he had complained 
to managers that an assistant manager had fired a coworker on the basis of race. Id. 
158 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
159 CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954, 1959. 
160 The CBOCS West Court accepted Jackson’s interpretation that Sullivan permitted a 
retaliation claim under § 1982. Id. at 1955 (“[T]his Court has made clear that Sullivan stands for 
the proposition that § 1982 encompasses retaliation claims.” (citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. 
of Educ. 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005))). To overcome the defendant’s argument that the text of 
§ 1981 did not explicitly include protection from retaliation, the Court also relied on Jackson’s 
interpretation that Title IX encompassed retaliation claims even though it does not use the word 
“retaliation.” Id. at 1958 (“Despite the fact that Title IX does not use the word ‘retaliation,’ the 
Court held in Jackson that the statute’s language encompassed such a claim . . . .”). 
161 Id. at 1955. 
162 See id. at 1955–56 (“While the Sullivan decision interpreted § 1982, our precedents 
have long construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.”). 
163 See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN G. ROBERTS 
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these changes to the Court’s composition, the Court decided CBOCS 
West with a seven-justice majority that included Roberts and Alito,164 
a larger margin than the five-to-four Jackson decision.165  
Moreover, in at least one way, the CBOCS West employee-plaintiff 
had to overcome a stronger argument based on the statutory language 
of § 1981 than the Jackson plaintiff had to address under Title IX. 
Recent congressional amendments to § 1981 gave support to those 
who argued that the statute did not protect employees from retaliation 
because the amendments failed to address retaliation specifically. In 
1989, the Court held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union166 that the 
antidiscrimination language of § 1981 (“to make and enforce 
contracts”) did not apply to “conduct by the employer after the 
contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms 
of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working 
conditions.”167 Although Patterson did not specifically involve a 
retaliation claim, various appellate courts have interpreted Patterson 
to preclude retaliation claims under § 1981 because most retaliation 
victims oppose discriminatory conduct after the formation of the 
contract, thus taking whistleblowing employees out of § 1981’s 
protective scope.168 Two years after Patterson, Congress passed the 
                                                                                                                 
 
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3 (2005), available at www.afj.org/afj_roberts 
_prehearing_report.pdf (“Judge Roberts’ apparent view of Congress’ authority potentially 
threatens a wide swath of legislation rooted in the Commerce Clause, including civil rights 
safeguards, minimum wage and maximum hour laws, clean air, clean water, and workplace 
safety protections.”); Editorial, Judge Alito’s Radical Views, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A18 
(“Judge Alito has consistently shown a bias in favor of those in power over those who need the 
law to protect them. Women, racial minorities, the elderly and workers who come to court 
seeking justice should expect little sympathy.”); Press Release, National Women’s Law Center, 
Judge Alito’s Record Highly Troubling on Women’s Rights (Oct. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/judge-alitos-record-highly-troubling-womens-rights (“[Alito] 
has issued decisions making it harder for victims of race and sex discrimination to prove their 
cases.”); John R. Kroger, Bench Brawl, SALON.COM (Oct. 31, 2005, 1:24 PM), http://www.salon 
.com/news/opinion/feature/2005/10/31/alito_reax (noting Alito’s conservative record in 
employment cases); More Groups Announce Opposition to Roberts, NOMINATIONWATCH.ORG 
(Sept. 21, 2005, 4:51 PM), http://www.nominationwatch.org/2005/09/more_groups_ann.html 
(noting labor and union group opposition to Roberts’ confirmation); Michael Scherer, Why Big 
Business Hearts John Roberts, SALON.COM (Aug. 11, 2005, 7:01 PM), http://www.salon.com 
/news/feature/2005/08/11/roberts_business (discussing that the nomination of John Roberts to 
the Supreme Court would support the interests of businesses and corporations). 
164 Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito. CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice Thomas 
wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Scalia. Id. 
165 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 169 (2005).  
166 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
167 Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
168 See CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1956–57 (listing the circuit courts of appeals cases that 
barred retaliation claims under § 1981). 
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Civil Rights Act of 1991,169 which explicitly overruled the case by 
adding a new subsection to § 1981: “For purposes of this section, the 
term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, 
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all 
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”170 Notably, the amended provision did not explicitly 
provide antiretaliation protection.  
The absence of antiretaliation language in the 1991 amendments 
presented more difficulty for the CBOCS West plaintiff than the 
statutory silence in Title IX at issue in Jackson, for two reasons. First, 
immediately before and after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress 
enacted several very specific antiretaliation provisions in other 
employment statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990,171 the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,172 and the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act of 1994.173 
Then, in 1994, Congress amended the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982 to include explicit antiretaliation protection.174 
In other words, Congress clearly knew how to enact an explicit 
antiretaliation provision and how to amend an older statute to include 
one. Congress, however, chose not to include a specific antiretaliation 
provision in its amendment of § 1981, which could indicate a specific 
intent to exclude retaliation claims from § 1981’s coverage. 
Second, by 1991, the Supreme Court had begun requiring that 
courts strictly construe statutory language when determining whether 
an implied right of action existed—a change from the judicial 
atmosphere in 1972 when Congress passed Title IX. Notably, two 
years before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which 
amended § 1981, Patterson required a narrow textual reading of 
§ 1981 specifically.175 More broadly, since 1975 in Cort v. Ash,176 the 
Court has made it clear that it would focus its statutory interpretation 
efforts on the literal text, rather than the more permissive pre-Cort 
emphasis on legislative purpose.177 Thus, even if Congress could have 
                                                                                                                 
169 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
170 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2006). 
171 Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 503, 104 Stat. 327, 370 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)–(b) 
(2006)). 
172 Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 105, 107 Stat. 6, 14 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006)). 
173 Pub. L. No. 103-353, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 3149, 3153 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) 
(2006)). 
174 Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(e), 108 Stat. 745, 990 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006)). 
175 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989) (noting that § 1981 is 
“limited to the enumerated rights within its express protection, specifically the right to make and 
enforce contracts”). 
176 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
177 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
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had Sullivan’s purportedly broad reading of § 1982 on its mind when 
it passed Title IX in 1972, as the Jackson Court concluded,178 
Congress would have known in 1991 that it needed to include explicit 
language regarding protection from retaliation in its statutes.179 Thus, 
the primary statutory-interpretation argument utilized by the Court in 
Jackson held much less power when the CBOCS West Court 
evaluated the changes the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made to § 1981. 
The Court dismissed these arguments, however, by pointing to the 
1991 Act’s legislative history. The Court cited a House Report 
indicating that the amended provision would provide protection from 
a long list of employment actions, including retaliation.180 Moreover, 
the Court put great emphasis on a footnote in that same Report, which 
noted that the legislation would restore the right to sue for retaliation. 
The courts previously had assumed that this right was eliminated 
under Patterson.181 Therefore, because the purpose of the 1991 Act 
was to nullify Patterson, the Court concluded that Congress also must 
have intended to “embrace pre-Patterson law,” including Sullivan.182 
The Supreme Court’s second implied retaliation case in 2008, 
Gomez-Perez v. Potter,183 involved a provision of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967184 (ADEA) that addresses 
age discrimination against federal employees (as opposed to private-
sector employees).185 Section 15(a) of the ADEA, codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 633a(a), states that all employment decisions affecting 
                                                                                                                 
 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1131 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that Cort v. Ash 
“marks a watershed in the legisprudence of implied causes of action. Before Cort, private causes 
of action were usually implied; after Cort, usually not.”); see also Humphries v. CBOCS W., 
Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 410 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting in part) (“[S]ince the 
1970s the Court has lashed interpretation more closely to statutory text.”). 
178 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2005). 
179 As Chief Judge Easterbrook noted in his partial dissent in the Seventh Circuit case that 
led to the Supreme Court’s CBOCS West decision: “There has been a sea change in 
interpretative method between Sullivan and today—and Patterson not only exemplifies the 
change but also applies it to § 1981. . . . [W]hen § 1981 was amended in 1991, decisions such as 
Cort and Rodriguez and Patterson had announced a textual approach.” CBOCS W, 474 F.3d at 
411 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting in part). 
180 CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2008) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
102-40, pt. 1, at 92–93 (1991)). 
181 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 92 n.92 (1991)). 
182 Id. at 1959. Adding to the anomalous nature of this conclusion, the Court recently held 
that, when Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to benefit plaintiffs—in 
an express effort to adjust the “burden of proof” standard that the Court had adopted for Title 
VII cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)—Congress intentionally did not 
amend the “burden of proof” standard for ADEA cases. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).  
183 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008). 
184 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
185 29 U.S.C. § 633a. 
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federal employees or applicants who are at least forty years of age 
“shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.”186 As with 
the other implied retaliation cases addressed thus far, the Gomez-
Perez Court decided that this general prohibition on discrimination 
included a claim for retaliation.187 The majority in Gomez-Perez 
conducted a relatively cursory analysis: the ADEA contains general 
language banning discrimination based on age; age is a protected 
category similar to race and sex; the Court has already implied 
retaliation claims from general language banning discrimination 
based on race and sex (in Sullivan and Jackson, respectively); 
therefore, a retaliation claim should be implied from the ADEA’s 
general antidiscriminatory language.188 
The majority’s quick syllogistic analysis and easy reliance on 
precedent belie a deeper problem with a claim for retaliation under 
§ 633a(a). This problem partially revisits the same issue the § 1981 
retaliation claim in CBOCS West confronted regarding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. That is, how should the Court interpret 
congressional silence at a time when Congress included clear 
antiretaliation provisions in other statutes?189 In Gomez-Perez, 
however, the circumstances surrounding congressional passage of the 
federal-government sections of the ADEA presented an even greater 
challenge to finding an implied claim for retaliation than the Court 
faced in either Jackson or CBOCS West.190  
When Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, the Act applied only to 
the private sector and included both an antidiscrimination provision 
and a separate antiretaliation provision.191 Seven years later, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
186 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). 
187 Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936. The plaintiff in Gomez-Perez claimed that her 
employer had retaliated against her for filing an age discrimination complaint. Id. at 1935. 
188 Id. at 1937 (“Following the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson, we interpret the ADEA 
federal-sector provision’s prohibition of ‘discrimination based on age’ as likewise proscribing 
retaliation. The statutory language at issue here (‘discrimination based on age’) is not materially 
different from the language at issue in Jackson (‘“discrimination”’ ‘“on the basis of sex”’) and 
is the functional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan [(‘discrimination on the basis of 
race’)]. And the context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases; 
that is, all three cases involve remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination.” (citation 
omitted)). Justice Alito wrote the six-to-three decision. Id. at 1934. Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
a dissenting opinion joined in part by Justices Thomas and Scalia. Id. at 1943 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 1951 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 171–79. 
190 See Charles A. Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007–2008 Supreme Court Term, 
24 LAB. LAW. 147, 155–56 (2008) (noting that Gomez-Perez was a “harder retaliation case” 
than CBOCS West because the ADEA private-sector provision had an antiretaliation provision 
and because Gomez-Perez presented a “weaker stare decisis argument”). 
191 Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4, 81 Stat. 602, 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623 
(2006)). Section 4(a)(1) made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any 
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passed the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,192 which 
added § 633a to the ADEA to prevent age discrimination against most 
executive-branch employees.193 Congress, however, did not include a 
specific antiretaliation provision in the amendment covering federal 
workers—a distinct difference between the amendment and the 
original ADEA applicable to the private sector. Moreover, Congress 
was clearly aware of the ADEA’s original provisions protecting 
private-sector employees from discrimination and, separately, 
retaliation. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Gomez-Perez 
dissent,194 the amendments made these separate private-sector 
provisions applicable to states and their political subdivisions, but 
Congress independently enacted § 633a (without a distinct 
antiretaliation provision) to apply to the federal government.195 A 
further piece of evidence from the 1974 FLSA Amendments suggests 
that Congress deliberately chose not to include a separate 
antiretaliation provision in the section of the ADEA applicable to 
federal employees. As part of the Amendments, Congress amended 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend it, and its 
antiretaliation provision, to federal employees.196 Again, as Chief 
Justice Roberts argued in dissent, “Congress did not similarly subject 
the Federal Government to the express antiretaliation provision in the 
ADEA, strongly suggesting that this was a conscious choice.”197  
The majority, however, disagreed with the Chief Justice regarding 
the meaning of the dissimilar structure utilized by the private-sector 
                                                                                                                 
 
individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” Id. § 4(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a)(1)). Section 4(d) prevented retaliation against any employee or applicant who “has 
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
litigation under [the ADEA].” Id. § 4(d) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)). 
192 Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 15(a), 88 Stat. 55, 74–75 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006)). 
193 Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1944 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
194 Id. at 1946 (“Congress obviously had the private-sector ADEA provision prominently 
before it when it enacted § 633a, because the same bill that included § 633a also amended the 
private-sector provision.”). The Chief Justice cited section 28(a)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 630(b) (2006), which broadened the definition of “employer” to include states and their 
political subdivisions. Id. 
195 Id. at 1947. As Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
Congress specifically chose in the FLSA Amendments to treat States and the 
Federal Government differently with respect to the ADEA itself. It subjected the 
former to the ADEA’s private-sector provision—including the express prohibition 
against retaliation in § 623(d)—while creating § 633a as a stand-alone prohibition 
against discrimination in federal employment, without an antiretaliation provision. 
This decision evinces a deliberate legislative choice not to extend those portions of 
the ADEA’s private-sector provisions that are not expressly included in § 633a . . . . 
Id. at 1947–48 (citations omitted). 
196 Id. at 1947. 
197 Id. 
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and the federal-sector provisions. In response to his criticism, the 
majority (as it did in CBOCS West) relied heavily on Sullivan. They 
claimed that when Congress enacted a “broad, general ban” on age 
discrimination, “Congress was presumably familiar with Sullivan and 
had reason to expect that this ban would be interpreted ‘in 
conformity’ with that precedent.”198 Therefore, the fact that separate 
provisions of the ADEA addressed retaliation differently “does not 
provide a sufficient reason to depart from the reasoning of Sullivan 
and Jackson.”199 
2. Explicit Protection: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The year after Jackson, the Supreme Court turned to the explicit 
antiretaliation provision of Title VII. In Burlington Northern & Santa 
Fe Railway Co. v. White,200 the Court had to determine the types of 
adverse employment actions that qualify as employer retaliation.201 In 
many ways, the case provided a mirror image of Jackson. While 
Jackson required the Court to find retaliation protection as an implicit 
part of a broad antidiscrimination provision,202 Burlington Northern 
emphasized that protection from discrimination differs from 
protection from retaliation.203 For Jackson, retaliation was part of 
discrimination; for Burlington Northern, retaliation required a 
separate analysis. Yet, in both cases, the Court found in favor of 
protecting employees from retaliation. 
The plaintiff in Burlington Northern claimed that her employer 
had retaliated against her for complaining about gender 
discrimination. First, her employer reassigned her to a position with 
less prestige and more arduous responsibilities. Then, it suspended 
her without pay for thirty-seven days (although the company later 
reinstated her with back pay).204 To evaluate whether these actions 
                                                                                                                 
198 Id. at 1941 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1942 n.6 (using the same rationale to 
discredit the Respondent’s argument that the explicit antiretaliation provision in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 prohibited the existence of an implicit antiretaliation provision in the 
ADEA). 
199 Id. at 1941. 
200 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
201 Id. at 61 (“[We must] decide whether Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids only 
those employer actions and resulting harms that are related to employment or the workplace. 
And we must characterize how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to 
fall within the provision’s scope.”). 
202 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (“We conclude that 
when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, 
this constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.”). 
203 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 62–64 (arguing that there is a difference between 
“discrimination” and “retaliation”). 
204 Id. at 57–59. 
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violated Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, the Court had to 
determine the scope of the statute’s provision barring an employer 
from “discriminating against” an employee for opposing any practice 
made unlawful by Title VII, or for participating in a Title VII 
proceeding or investigation.205 
Several courts of appeals had determined that Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision should be read to prohibit only adverse 
actions related to employment, which would be the same standard that 
courts apply to claims made under Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
provision.206 Others had taken an even more restrictive approach by 
limiting actionable retaliation to “ultimate employment” decisions, 
“such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating.”207 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted Title VII 
broadly, holding that it prohibited not only employment-related 
retaliation, but also actions unrelated to employment that could have 
an impact on an employee’s willingness to report discrimination.208  
The Court based its holding on the language and the purpose of 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.209 First, the language of Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision differs from its antidiscrimination 
provision.210 Title VII prohibits discrimination by prohibiting specific 
actions related to employment: failing or refusing to hire or discharge, 
discriminating with respect to an employee’s compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment, or limiting employment 
opportunities.211 The antiretaliation provision, however, does not have 
                                                                                                                 
205 Id. at 56–57.  
206 See id. at 60 (citing White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 
2004); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
207 Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th 
Cir. 1997).  
208 Id. at 67–68. The Court decided in favor of the employee with a nine-to-zero vote. 
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by seven other Justices. Id. at 55. 
Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only. Id. at 73 (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
209 Id. at 62–63 (majority opinion). 
210 Id. at 61–62. 
211 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The provision reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—  
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or  
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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such limiting language. It prohibits an employer generally from 
“discriminat[ing]” against employees or applicants in retaliation.212 
Second, the Court found that Congress intended these linguistic 
differences to make a “legal difference” because the two provisions 
had different purposes as well.213 Because the “substantive” 
antidiscrimination provision seeks to prevent discrimination in the 
workplace, Congress needed only to prohibit acts related to 
employment. The antiretaliation provision, however, aims to prevent 
discrimination by blocking an employer from interfering with any 
effort by an employee to enforce the statute’s substantive 
antidiscrimination objectives.214 To support this objective, Title VII 
necessarily must prevent a broader range of employer actions because 
of the various nonemployment ways in which an employer could 
deter employees from “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”215 
Finally, the Court noted that, although the actionable retaliatory 
conduct was broader than discriminatory conduct, it was not limitless. 
The Court stated, “it is important to separate significant from trivial 
harms.”216 Thus, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision covers all 
employer actions “that would have been materially adverse to a 
reasonable employee or job applicant.”217 By “materially adverse,” 
the Court meant any employer action that “could well dissuade a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”218 This objective standard recognizes that “petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” are not 
actionable because they are unlikely to deter employees from 
complaining to the EEOC about discrimination.219  
Using this standard, the Court found that both the retaliatory 
reassignment and the unpaid suspension imposed by the employer in 
                                                                                                                 
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The provision reads:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
213 Burlington N., 544 U.S. at 63. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 64 (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
216 Id. at 68. 
217 Id. at 57. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 68. 
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this case violated Title VII because these actions would likely 
dissuade an employee from bringing a charge of discrimination.220  
Interestingly, as Justice Alito noted, the Court need not have 
issued such a broad holding in order to find the employer’s conduct in 
violation of Title VII.221 According to Justice Alito, the standards 
used in various appellate courts, which limit antiretaliation protection 
to “adverse employment actions,” would still have allowed the Court 
to declare that the employer’s conduct violated Title VII.222 
Nevertheless, in the face of significant differences among the circuits 
as to the scope of this provision, the Court decided to clarify the issue 
by requiring a standard more protective of employees. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent retaliation opinion, issued in 
2009, also involved Title VII and its explicit antiretaliation provision. 
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson 
County, Tennessee223 considered whether Title VII’s retaliation 
provision protected an employee who participated in an employer’s 
internal investigation of a sexual-harassment complaint.224 The 
employee claimed that she was fired for responding to her employer’s 
questions and reporting that another employee had engaged in sexual 
harassment.225 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects two types of conduct. 
First, it prohibits retaliation against an employee who “has opposed” 
an employer’s violation of Title VII.226 Second, the statute protects an 
employee who “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title 
VII].”227 The Crawford plaintiff argued that both Title VII’s 
“opposition” clause as well as its “participation” clause prohibited 
retaliation against her based on her conduct during her employer’s 
internal investigation.228 
The Court evaluated the claim only under the opposition clause 
and determined that the employee’s actions during the investigation 
constituted protected conduct.229 The Sixth Circuit viewed the 
plaintiff’s conduct as insufficient because it believed Title VII 
required “active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to 
                                                                                                                 
220 Id. at 70–73. 
221 Id. at 79–80 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
222 See id. 
223 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). 
224 Id. at 849. 
225 Id. 
226 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
227 Id. 
228 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850. 
229 Id. at 853. 
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warrant . . . protection against retaliation.”230 Relying primarily on the 
“ordinary” dictionary meaning of the term “oppose,” the Supreme 
Court disagreed.231 As with the Court’s other recent retaliation cases, 
this conclusion is debatable; for example, the circuit courts were split 
regarding the extent to which Title VII’s antiretaliation provision 
requires “active” opposition.232 Moreover, the Court could have 
chosen numerous other definitions of “oppose,” including ones that 
require much more active and overt resistance.233 
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that not protecting employees like 
the plaintiff would undermine the effectiveness of the scheme the 
Court had implemented in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth234 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,235 which encouraged employer 
internal investigations of sexual-harassment claims.236 Thus, 
according to the Court, Title VII’s opposition clause goes beyond 
active opposition to protect any form of communication to the 
employer in which the employee communicates a belief that the 
employer has violated Title VII.237  
                                                                                                                 
230 Id. at 851 (omission in original) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & 
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 211 Fed. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted). 
231 Id. at 850 (“RESIST frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE.” (quoting 
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1957)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
232 Compare Crawford, 211 Fed. App’x at 376 (requiring active opposition to invoke Title 
VII antiretaliation protections), and McNorton v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 
1376 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that an employee’s cooperation with an internal investigation did 
not meet the required definition of “opposition conduct” for Title VII purposes), with 
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding Title VII antiretaliation 
protections for an employee who engaged in “passive” opposition to discrimination). 
233 See, e.g., McNorton, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (noting recent dictionary definitions that 
define oppose with active terms); Brief for Respondent at 27, Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846 (No. 06-
1595), 2008 WL 2066116 (same). 
234 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
235 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
236 See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that employers could have an affirmative 
defense to some sexual-harassment claims so long as they can show that they exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct employee sexual harassment, and that the 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventative or corrective 
opportunities).  
According to the Court in Crawford, it was necessary to disavow the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning and holding because failure to do so would result in an impossible Catch-22: on the 
one hand, an employee could be penalized for responding to an employer’s sexual-harassment 
inquiries; on the other hand, if the employee failed to respond to those inquiries, then the 
employer would have an affirmative to defense to any future Title VII claim because the 
employee had unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventative or 
corrective opportunities. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852. 
237 Id. at 851 (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision extends to an employee who 
reports sexual harassment during an employer’s inquiry). 
 2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE 413 
B. First Amendment Protection 
In the midst of this series of cases addressing statutory 
antiretaliation protection, the Court also addressed the breadth of 
protection the First Amendment provides to government employees. 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court significantly limited the 
circumstances in which an employee may claim constitutional 
protection from retaliation. The five-to-four Garcetti majority held 
that the First Amendment does not protect public employees from 
discipline related to speech made pursuant to their official duties.238 
The Garcetti plaintiff, a deputy district attorney, informed his 
supervisors in a memo that a sheriff’s affidavit that was being relied 
on in a criminal case, contained serious misrepresentations.239 After a 
meeting between the plaintiff and his supervisors about the veracity 
of the affidavit and the merits of the case, the supervisors decided to 
proceed with the prosecution over the plaintiff’s protests.240 
Ultimately, the criminal defendant called the plaintiff as a witness, 
and he reiterated his misgivings about the sheriff’s affidavit.241 After 
the hearing, the plaintiff claimed that the district attorney’s office 
violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for the 
memo.242 
In addressing the claim, the Court initially provided an exhaustive 
review of its First Amendment jurisprudence and reiterated that it 
required a delicate balancing of the employee’s interest in speaking 
out as a citizen and the government employer’s interest in operational 
efficiency.243 Importantly, the Court also identified a third interest that 
must be balanced: the “public’s interest in receiving the well-
informed views of government employees engaging in civic 
discussion.”244 As summarized by the Court, its decisions “have 
sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are 
                                                                                                                 
238 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 
Justices Stevens and Breyer each filed a dissent, and Justice Souter filed a third dissent joined 
by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at 412. 
239 Id. at 413–14. 
240 Id. at 414.  
241 Id. at 414–15. 
242 Id. at 415. 
243 Id. at 417–19. 
244 Id. at 419; see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) 
(“Were [public employees] not able to speak on these matters, the community would be 
deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the 
public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate 
it.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Treasury Emps., 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-
scale disincentive to Government employees’ expression also imposes a significant burden on 
the public’s right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”). 
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served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public 
concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting 
to perform their important public functions.”245 
Within this framework, the Court found that the employee in 
Garcetti acted pursuant to his job duties, which the Court interpreted 
to mean that he was speaking as an employee rather than as a 
citizen.246 According to the Court, this distinction meant that the 
government employer had more discretion to control his speech and 
to discipline him if the employer found the speech to be too disruptive 
or inaccurate.247 “When . . . the employee is simply performing his or 
her job duties,” the Constitution does not require the same “delicate 
balancing” that is necessary when a government employee speaks as a 
private citizen on a matter of public concern.248 
The Court seemed attuned to at least one likely consequence of its 
holding: that government employees will report misconduct less 
frequently. Yet, despite recognizing that “[e]xposing governmental 
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable 
significance,”249 the Court ultimately asserted that encouraging 
employees to blow the whistle was not necessarily the Constitution’s 
job.250 Instead, the Court pointed to other potential safeguards, such as 
an employer’s “internal policies and procedures that are receptive to 
employee criticism,” a “powerful network of legislative enactments—
such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to 
those who seek to expose wrongdoing,” and attorney rules of 
conduct.251 
In dissent, Justice Souter argued for a different sort of balancing, 
one that placed more emphasis on society’s interest in government 
employee speech. Although Justice Souter recognized a government 
employer’s need to manage its workforce, he asserted that society’s 
interest “in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and 
safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient 
implementation of policy.”252 Thus, when an employee speaks on a 
matter of “unusual importance and satisfies high standards of 
responsibility in the way he does it,” the fact that the speech related to 
the employee’s job duties should not automatically exclude 
                                                                                                                 
245 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420. 
246 Id. at 421. 
247 Id. at 422–23. 
248 Id. at 423. 
249 Id. at 425. 
250 See id. at 426 (“Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of 
action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”). 
251 Id. at 424–25. 
252 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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protection.253 Justice Souter defined matters of “unusual importance” 
to include “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, 
other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”254  
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he called the 
majority’s views “misguided” because constitutional protection 
should not turn on whether an employee’s words fell within the 
employee’s job description.255  
Finally, Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the majority’s “job 
duty” rule was too categorical, and that some limited First 
Amendment protection should still be provided to speech arising out 
of an employee’s professional and constitutional obligations.256 
Justice Breyer, however, labeled as “too broad” Justice Souter’s 
exception for employee speech on “matters of unusual importance,” 
and declared that the exception caused too much judicial interference 
in government employment matters.257 
C. The Antiretaliation Principle and the Recent Cases 
Taken together, the six recent Court opinions dealing with 
retaliation appear untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy. In 
Jackson, the Court asserted that protection from retaliation was part 
of a statute’s general antidiscrimination protection,258 while in 
Burlington Northern, the Court upheld broad retaliation protection 
because it was different from a statute’s discrimination protection.259 
The importance of stare decisis controlled the outcomes of CBOCS 
West and Gomez-Perez,260 while in Jackson the Court ignored 
important precedent.261 The Court implied broad retaliation protection 
when statutes were silent,262 yet refused to imply even modest 
                                                                                                                 
253 Id. at 435. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
256 Id. at 446–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
257 Id. at 448–49. 
258 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (finding that retaliation 
against one who reports sex discrimination constitutes “sex based discrimination” in violation of 
Title IX).  
259 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006).  
260 CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008) (“[O]ur conclusion rests 
in significant part upon principles of stare decisis . . . .”); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 
1931, 1937 (2008) (resting the Court’s holding on the principles of stare decisis). 
261 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171–84 (finding an implicit antiretaliation right of action 
under Title IX, but not mentioning Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court’s 
seminal case on implied rights of action); id. at 177–78 (distinguishing Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001), where the Court decided not to imply a disparate-impact right of 
action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a sister statute to Title IX). 
262 See CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)); Gomez-
Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006)); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 
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protections when examining the First Amendment.263 Although the 
Court typically emphasizes strict statutory interpretation and 
congressional intent, it broadly interpreted antiretaliation statutory 
provisions and examined congressional purpose in both Crawford and 
Burlington Northern.264 In Crawford, the Court generously construed 
the definition of the word “oppose,”265 while in Burlington Northern 
the Court interpreted the phrase “discriminate against” to include 
actions taken against employees that are unrelated to employment.266 
Most fundamentally, of course, the Court expanded retaliation 
protection in the five statutory cases and greatly restricted it in the 
constitutional case. 
The recent cases also present numerous surprises when viewed 
more broadly against the Court’s nonretaliation cases. First, the 
employee won five of the six retaliation cases, a rarity for this Court 
that often narrowly construes employee protections in other contexts. 
For example, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,267 the Court 
held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
required a substantially higher causation standard than previously had 
been thought to apply.268 Additionally, in the last few years, the Court 
severely limited the statute of limitations for discrimination cases,269 
restricted the application of the Equal Protection Clause for public 
employees,270 and undermined Title VII’s protection from disparate 
impact discrimination.271 Although numbers do not tell the whole 
                                                                                                                 
 
(interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006)). 
263 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”). 
264 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 
(2009) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broadly); Burlington N., 548 U.S. 
at 56–57 (same). 
265 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850. 
266 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 56–57. 
267 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
268 Id. at 2351–52. 
269 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177–78 (2007) 
(holding that any act of unlawful Title VII employment discrimination, including those 
involving compensation, must be presented to the EEOC within the period ordered in the 
statute, which, in this case, was 180 days), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).  
270 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008) (holding that “class 
of one” equal-protection claims are not cognizable in the public-employment context). 
271 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (holding that a city’s decision to 
throw out the results of a firefighter promotion test, which was passed almost exclusively by 
whites, was “impermissible under Title VII unless the [city could] demonstrate a strong basis in 
evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under [Title VII’s disparate-
treatment prohibition]”). 
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story,272 the win-loss record for employees in retaliation cases 
conflicts with the conventional wisdom that this Court generally 
favors business interests in employment cases.273 
Second, many of the recent retaliation cases undermine 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent. In particular, the implied 
retaliation cases ignore the Court’s traditional reluctance to imply a 
right of action when a statute does not explicitly provide for one. In 
the last few decades, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of 
federal courts to imply private rights of action by abandoning inquiry 
into a statute’s purpose.274 Rather, federal courts must utilize basic 
statutory interpretation tools to examine whether Congress 
specifically intended to create a right of action.275  
Yet, in the face of this precedent, the Court went out of its way to 
permit three claims for retaliation when no antiretaliation provision 
existed.276 As mentioned above, although the reliance on Sullivan may 
                                                                                                                 
272 See Harkavy, supra note 4, at 2 (“For those who insist on keeping a scorecard, 
employees appeared at first blush to fare better this [2007] term than last. Indeed, employees 
‘won’ six and ‘lost’ three of the ten decisions pitting them directly against their employers.”); 
Shanor, supra note 190, at 154 (“If this is a more conservative Court, it did not show it in 
[CBOCS West].”). 
273 See, e.g., Christine Cooper, Employment Cases from the 2006–2007 Supreme Court 
Term, 23 LAB. LAW. 223, 224 (2008) (“Of course the Court has tilted to the right.”); Ramona L. 
Paetzold, Supreme Court’s 2005–2006 Term Employment Law Cases: Do New Justices Imply 
New Directions?, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 348 (2006) (noting that after the 2005–
2006 term, “preliminary indicia of a new conservatism do exist”); Michael Selmi, The Supreme 
Court’s 2006–2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet but Revealing Term, 11 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 219, 220 (2007) (“The other patently obvious lesson this [2006–2007] term 
provided is that this is a tough time for plaintiffs in the employment context.”); Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Express Skepticism in a Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, 
at A26 (discussing whether the Supreme Court really has “drifted so far toward the employer’s 
side in job discrimination cases that it is now to the right of the Bush administration”); see also 
Robert Barnes, Term Saw High Court Move to the Right, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at A1 
(noting after the 2008–2009 term that the Supreme Court’s “path [is] clear: a patient and steady 
move to the right led by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.”). 
274 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (delineating a four factor test for federal courts 
to apply when evaluating whether there is a private cause of action implicit in a statute). 
275 See, e.g., id. at 78–79 (applying four factors to determine the legislative intent behind a 
statute); Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) 
(“Congress undoubtedly was aware from our cases such as Cort v. Ash that the Court had 
departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of 
action should be recognized, and that such issues were being resolved by a straightforward 
inquiry into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action.” (citation omitted)); 
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15–16 (1979) (“While some 
opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying 
private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a 
given statute, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the 
private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.” (citation omitted)). 
276 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008) (holding that 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 contains an implicit antiretaliation provision); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 
1931, 1936 (2008) (holding that the ADEA contains an implicit antiretaliation provision); 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (holding that Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 contains an implicit antiretaliation provision); see also Lynn 
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have been appropriate to discern Congressional intent in Jackson, this 
rationale loses its force when applied to § 1981 in CBOCS West and 
the ADEA in Gomez-Perez. Congress created the statutory language 
at issue in both of these later cases during a period when it also 
enacted numerous statutes with very specific antiretaliation 
provisions. It is unlikely that Congress relied on Sullivan’s vague 
holding in 1974 when it enacted the ADEA or in 1991 when it 
amended the Civil Rights Act because Congress also included 
specific antiretaliation language in other legislation during that 
time.277 Moreover, when it enacted the ADEA and the 1991 
Amendment’s antidiscrimination language in § 1981, Congress 
certainly was aware that the Court required specific language in order 
to recognize a private cause of action.278 This legislative reality 
significantly undermines the Court’s conclusion that Congress 
actually constructed a general antidiscrimination provision without an 
antiretaliation clause because it was relying on the Court’s Sullivan 
opinion released years before.279 At a minimum, the fact that the 
Court’s arguments present substantial problems should make 
commentators question why the Court worked so hard to imply rights 
of action for retaliation after years of reluctance to do so in any other 
case. 
Third, for a Supreme Court that prides itself on closely adhering to 
statutory language when interpreting the law,280 the recent Title VII 
retaliation cases demonstrate the Court’s willingness to examine 
congressional purpose in addition to statutory language. For example, 
Title VII itself gives little indication as to what exactly it prevents 
employers from doing in retaliation: the statute prohibits only 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ridgeway Zehrt, Retaliation’s Changing Landscape, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 143, 179–80 
(2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s revival of implied antiretaliation provisions in civil 
rights statutes). 
277 See supra notes 171–74, 191–97 and accompanying text. 
278 See Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 536 (noting that Congress is aware of the Court’s “straight-
forward inquiry” standard for determining whether or not a statute contains an implicit private 
cause of action). 
279 See Harkavy, supra note 4, at 10 (noting in Gomez-Perez the “undeniable anomaly that 
Congress provided an express remedy for retaliation against private employees, but did not do 
so in similar terms for federal employees”). 
280 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006) 
(rejecting the respondents’ reliance on a statute’s legislative history as insufficient in the face of 
unambiguous text); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567–71 (2005) 
(rejecting the use of other interpretive tools because the statute in question was not ambiguous); 
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (noting that the Court is “not free to rewrite the 
statute that Congress has enacted”); see also Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 410 
(7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting in part) (noting that these cases indicate that the 
Supreme Court “insists that statutory language be followed even if inconvenient or jarring”). 
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“discrimination.”281 Before Burlington Northern, many lower courts 
had held that this provision should be read in pari materia with Title 
VII’s antidiscrimination provision; in other words, they both address 
the same type of employer action taken towards employees in the 
employment setting.282 The Supreme Court, however, refused to 
follow this standard canon of statutory interpretation in Burlington 
Northern. After a cursory look at the differences between the specific 
language in the antidiscrimination provision and the general language 
in the antiretaliation provision, the Court felt that Congress’ purpose 
when it enacted the antiretaliation provision should guide the 
interpretation of the statute.283 Similarly, Title VII’s use of the term 
“oppose” does not have any inherent meaning as to the level of action 
required to “oppose” unlawful conduct. The Court’s majority and 
concurrence in Crawford presented dueling dictionary definitions to 
support their respective positions,284 but ultimately each opinion had 
to fall back on its own view of the provision’s purpose as well as the 
practical consequences of the interpretation of the word it 
presented.285 
Commentators have had difficulty following the twists and turns. 
Some assert that the Court has returned to an earlier era in which its 
goal is to divine congressional intent and advance Congress’ purposes 
through the Court’s interpretation of statutes.286 Others highlight and 
                                                                                                                 
281 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting 
discrimination against an employee because the employee has opposed or accused an employer 
with an unlawful employment practice). 
282 See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799–800 (6th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting the EEOC’s assertion that the court adopt a different definition of “adverse 
employment action” only for Title VII retaliation claims); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 
858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that to succeed in a Title VII antiretaliation claim, a plaintiff 
must show that a sufficient adverse employment action occurred); Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that courts have interpreted Title VII’s 
retaliation provision to require that the “alleged retaliation constitute ‘adverse employment 
action’” (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996))). 
283 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–64 (2006) (“[P]urpose 
reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the antiretaliation provision, unlike the 
substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and 
conditions of employment.”). 
284 Compare Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 
846, 850 (2009) (noting that Random House Dictionary defines “oppose” as being “hostile or 
adverse to, as in opinion” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 853–54 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting that the commonly understood definitions of “oppose” 
require active and purposeful conduct).  
285 Id. at 852–53 (majority opinion) (rejecting the “active” formulation of “oppose” 
because requiring the active definition would ultimately harm employees and encourage silence 
in the face of unlawful conduct); id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (embracing 
the “active” definition of “oppose” for Title VII antiretaliation purposes because otherwise it 
“would open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never express a word of 
opposition to their employers”). 
286 See Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s 
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analyze the Court’s use of various canons of statutory interpretation 
and judicially created legal fictions.287 In a thoughtful article after the 
Jackson opinion in 2005, Professor Deborah Brake provided a well-
reasoned argument that protection from retaliation was an implied 
part of protection from discrimination.288 
Other commentators view the decisions as little more than 
outcome-driven policy determinations in favor of retaliation 
protection; however, they cannot agree on the meaning of the 
outcomes.289 For example, Professor Richard Carlson has argued that 
the Court’s recent statutory retaliation cases do not necessarily “signal 
a consistently sympathetic judicial view” regarding retaliation against 
employees, in large part because they all hue closely to specific 
statutory language.290 Indeed, he dismissed these cases as “episodic 
expressions of support” that “belie a persistent ambivalence” toward 
employees who suffer retaliation when they advance the interest of 
the larger public good.291 In contrast, Daniel Westman, a prominent 
practitioner and author,292 asserted that the Court has been pro-
employee in retaliation cases because “[j]udges do not like the idea 
that witnesses are going to be intimidated and that translates into the 
workplace.”293  
Perhaps these decisions simply present examples of the Court 
deciding only the narrow issues of the cases before it: whether 
                                                                                                                 
 
Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded 
Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358, 395 (2008) (“[T]he Court recognized a cause of action [in 
Jackson] not merely because retaliation might fall within intent, but primarily because allowing 
retaliation would undermine Title IX’s purpose.”); cf. Shanor, supra note 190, at 172 (noting 
that the Court in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez “moved away from textual statutory 
construction to more contextual or pragmatist approaches to statutory interpretation”). 
287 See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 445, 449, 451–55 (2008) (asserting that the opinions in Gomez-Perez use 
rhetoric that appears to examine legislative intent, but, that, in reality, utilize judicially created 
legal fictions); Zehrt, supra note 276, at 153 (analyzing the three recent implied retaliation cases 
and arguing that the court “has eschewed any reliance on public policy and has chosen instead 
to base its decisions solely on statutory construction”).  
288 See Brake, supra note 7, at 21–22.  
289 See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 337, 365 (2005) (“To an optimist, Jackson is a valiant attempt by the 
judiciary to patch an unfortunate statutory hole. To a pessimist, the case is a contemptible 
example of tenuous reasoning chasing a desired policy outcome . . . .”). 
290 Carlson, supra note 7, at 244 (contrasting the pro-employee decisions in Jackson and 
Burlington Northern with the pro-employer decision in Garcetti). 
291 Id. at 240. 
292 See generally WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119; Daniel P. Westman, MORRISON 
& FOERSTER, http://www.mofo.com/daniel-westman (last visited Dec. 21, 2010). 
293 Coyle, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daniel Westman on the 
Supreme Court’s recent antiretaliation cases). Of course, Westman’s conclusion does not 
explain the Garcetti Court’s reluctance to protect a person who was both an employee and a 
witness. 
 2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE 421 
statutory language contains an implied right of action or covers 
certain actions. Admittedly, in each decision, the Court engaged in a 
discreet and nuanced examination of the specific statutory language 
and structure involved in each individual case. Indeed, to some the 
cases required only “careful scrutiny of the particular provision in 
question,”294 which would keep with the Court’s historic view 
limiting the instances in which it would read a statutory provision 
broadly or imbue an implied right of action. 
But a more comprehensive explanation exists. Placing these cases 
in the context of the Court’s other retaliation jurisprudence provides a 
perspective that brings consistency and a sense of order to these 
seemingly counterintuitive results. When placed in this context, one 
common theme can be discerned throughout the recent retaliation 
cases: the Antiretaliation Principle. The Court recognized that 
enforcing the law requires encouraging employees to provide 
information about employer misconduct. Antiretaliation protection 
means enhanced law enforcement, which the Court for fifty years has 
valued more than other competing concerns. Indeed, in several ways, 
the recent retaliation cases exemplify the Court’s longstanding 
acceptance of and adherence to the same Antiretaliation Principle that 
the Court has utilized consistently in the past. 
As an initial matter, the implied retaliation cases rely heavily on 
the holding of Sullivan, a case that, as mentioned above, relies on the 
Antiretaliation Principle to support its holding that § 1982 
incorporates an implied right of action for retaliation.295 Indeed, all 
three of the recent implied-retaliation cases pay homage to Sullivan’s 
reference to the Principle.296  
But, more than simply adopting Sullivan, the Court reinvigorated 
the Antiretaliation Principle through these recent cases. Again, the 
Antiretaliation Principle recognizes that law enforcement depends on 
employees blowing the whistle on illegal conduct—even if those 
employees are not the victims of that conduct. In order to encourage 
                                                                                                                 
294 Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1951 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 1939 (majority opinion) (“Jackson did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation 
because the Court concluded as a policy matter that such claims are important. Instead, the 
holding in Jackson was based on an interpretation of the ‘text of Title IX.’” (quoting Jackson v. 
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005))). 
295 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (finding that if an 
individual could be “punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by 
§ 1982,” then “[s]uch a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on 
property”); see also discussion supra Part I.  
296 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008) (beginning its 
interpretation with a discussion of Sullivan); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936 (applying the 
reasoning of Sullivan to the ADEA); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180 (“Sullivan made clear that 
retaliation claims extend to those who oppose discrimination against others.”).  
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them to come forward, the law must protect them from retaliation. 
Notably, like Sullivan, two of the three recent implied retaliation 
cases—Jackson and CBOCS West—involved third-party reporters of 
illegal discrimination.297 The Jackson plaintiff reported inequities in 
the girls’ basketball program298 and the CBOCS West plaintiff 
reported alleged discrimination against a coworker.299 The Jackson 
Court made it clear that the victim of retaliation can be (and often 
would be) different than the victim of the underlying 
discrimination.300 For Title IX specifically, the Court found that Title 
IX’s enforcement depended on complaints, particularly from insiders 
with firsthand knowledge about violations, such as teachers and 
coaches.301 
Thus, the Jackson Court explicitly adopted the Antiretaliation 
Principle:  
If recipients [of federal education funds] were permitted to 
retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination would 
be loath to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations 
might go unremedied as a result. 
Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX 
enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against 
those who report went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were 
not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would 
unravel. . . . Without protection from retaliation, individuals 
who witness discrimination would likely not report it . . . and 
the underlying discrimination would go unremedied.302  
This adoption paved the way for the subsequent implied-retaliation 
cases to do the same for similar reasons. The CBOCS West Court 
upheld a retaliation claim for § 1981 in part because its sister statute, 
                                                                                                                 
297 CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (involving an assistant manager who was fired after 
complaining about the race-based discharge of a fellow employee); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171 
(involving a male coach and gym teacher who complained about the girls’ basketball team 
receiving unequal access to athletic facilities and funding); Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234–37 
(involving the claim of Sullivan, a white man, who was expelled from his homeowners’ 
corporation for leasing his property to a black man and advocating against racial 
discrimination). 
298 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171. 
299 CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954. 
300 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179–80. 
301 Id. at 181 (“[T]eachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position to 
vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify discrimination and 
bring it to the attention of administrators. Indeed, sometimes adult employees are ‘the only 
effective adversar[ies]’ of discrimination in schools.” (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 
396 U.S. at 237)).  
302 Id. at 180–81 (citation omitted). 
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§ 1982, was held by Sullivan to provide “protection from retaliation 
for reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory 
right.”303 Although the Antiretaliation Principle is not as explicit in 
Gomez-Perez,304 the Court did reject the government employer’s 
argument that protection from retaliation was not necessary because 
third parties were not required to identify age discrimination and 
report it.305  
The Title VII cases also advanced the Antiretaliation Principle by 
broadly interpreting the statute’s express antiretaliation provision. 
First, in Burlington Northern, the Court reiterated that Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision prevents employers “from interfering 
(through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance 
enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”306 In short, the “primary 
purpose” of the provision is to maintain “unfettered access to 
statutory remedial mechanisms.”307 Because of this purpose, the Court 
held that the provision should be interpreted broadly so that 
employers would be deterred from retaliating against employees who 
might report wrongdoing.308 Citing back to the Court’s first 
expression of the Antiretaliation Principle, the Court in Burlington 
Northern explicitly relied on the Principle again: 
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of 
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as 
witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be 
expected if employees felt free to approach officials with 
their grievances.” Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to 
provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the 
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary 
objective depends.309  
                                                                                                                 
303 CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1958. 
304 The Gomez-Perez Court explicitly denied that it had made a policy-oriented 
determination in Jackson, even though the Jackson Court had discussed the important role of 
teachers and students in reporting illegal discrimination. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 
1931, 1938–39 (2008). The Court claimed that the Jackson Court’s discussion of this topic was 
merely in response to the Birmingham School Board’s argument that even if Title IX permitted 
some antiretaliation claims, only the actual victims of sex discrimination—and not reporting 
third parties—should be able to institute a claim. Id. at 1939. 
305 Id. at 1938–39. 
306 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
307 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
308 Id. at 67. 
309 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 
292 (1960)). 
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Even when the Court declined to consider “petty slights, minor 
annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” to be actionable 
retaliation, the Antiretaliation Principle guided the Court’s 
rationale.310 Allowing such de minimis harms would not prevent 
“unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms because those 
trivial acts would not reasonably deter an employee from reporting 
discrimination.311 By focusing on the Antiretaliation Principle—i.e., 
enhancing law enforcement by encouraging employees to blow the 
whistle on illegalities—the Court limited actionable retaliatory acts to 
those that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.”312  
The Court even modified its seemingly objective perspective on 
which actions would be “material.” By permitting some attention to 
be paid to whether an action would dissuade “a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff’s position,”313 the Court allowed for the introduction of 
individualized factors that might dissuade one type of person but not 
another from reporting. This subjectivity highlights the importance of 
encouraging employees to report misconduct. Ultimately, although 
the Court wanted to “screen out trivial conduct,” its focus was on the 
Antiretaliation Principle: preventing “those acts that are likely to 
dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints 
about discrimination.”314 
Crawford, the second Title VII case, also emphasized the 
importance of the Antiretaliation Principle through the Court’s 
recognition of the important role employee whistleblowers play in 
enforcing Title VII. As in Sullivan, Jackson, and CBOCS West, the 
plaintiff in Crawford was more of a reporter of discrimination than a 
victim asserting her own rights.315 Indeed, the Crawford Court made 
explicit its understanding that employees who report discrimination 
against others may face retaliation even when the whistleblower was 
not personally discriminated against.316  
                                                                                                                 
310 Id. at 68. 
311 Id. (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
312 Id. at 57; see also id. at 68–69 (discussing the incentives created by the antiretaliation 
principle). 
313 Id. at 69–70. 
314 Id. at 70. 
315 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849. 
(2009). Although the plaintiff in Crawford actually was a victim of sexual harassment, she is 
more of a “reporter” of discrimination because she informed her employer about the sexually 
harassing conduct only in direct response to an employer-instigated investigation. Id. 
316 Id. at 853 n.3 (“[E]mployees will often face retaliation not for opposing discrimination 
they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not 
‘victims’ of anything until they are retaliated against . . . .”). 
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After its discussion of various dictionary meanings of the word 
“oppose,” the Crawford Court focused on the primary policy 
justification for protecting employees who participate in internal 
corporate investigations. This policy rationale involved yet another 
restatement of the Antiretaliation Principle: 
If it were clear law that an employee who reported 
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be 
penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a 
good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against 
themselves or against others. This is no imaginary horrible 
given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation is 
the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing 
their concerns about bias and discrimination.”317 
Therefore, the five recent statutory retaliation cases reflect the same 
three premises supporting the Antiretaliation Principle that the Court 
has utilized for almost fifty years. First, the Court recognized that 
employees often have the best information about wrongdoing 
committed by an employer—a fact underscored by the plaintiffs in 
those cases, two of whom reported illegal conduct that was not 
directed at them.318 Second, as Crawford, Burlington Northern, and 
Jackson all explicitly recognized, employees will come forward with 
this inside information only if they are protected from retaliation.319 
Third, as Crawford, Burlington Northern, and Jackson made clear, 
effective law enforcement requires employees to report illegal 
conduct.320  
This theory explains these five recent statutory cases better than 
focusing solely on an argument that retaliation is another form of 
discrimination.321 Granted, language in the implied retaliation cases 
supports this position, particularly in Jackson, where the majority 
                                                                                                                 
317 Id. at 852 (alternation in original) (quoting Brake, supra note 7, at 20). 
318 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1954 (2008); Jackson v. 
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181 (2005). Moreover, in Crawford, the plaintiff was a 
victim of discrimination but reported the discrimination only during a general investigation 
conducted by her employer. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849. 
319 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 
67 (2005); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180–81. 
320 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; (discussing how reporting illegal conduct is an 
incentive for employers to stop discriminatory behavior); Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68 
(suggesting that absent antiretaliation laws, employers will interfere with employees’ legally 
protected remedies); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180–81; (“If recipients were able to avoid such notice 
by retaliating against all those who dare to complain, the statute’s enforcement scheme would be 
subverted.”). 
321 But see Brake, supra note 7, at 21–22 (arguing that the recognition of “retaliation” as a 
form of “discrimination” is an important and necessary step in legal theory).  
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makes this “retaliation equals discrimination” argument explicitly.322 
This rationale, however, does not explain Congress’ frequent practice 
of providing separate protection from retaliation in antidiscrimination 
laws.323 Nor does it provide insight for interpreting antiretaliation 
provisions in laws addressing problems other than discrimination.324 
Put another way: for a law to be enforced, whether it is a law against 
discrimination or otherwise, retaliation against those who report 
violations must be prevented.  
Framed in this manner, retaliation law is not limited by its 
association with discrimination; rather, discrimination law is merely 
one area in which antiretaliation protection is needed in order to 
enforce the law. Viewed from this perspective, Jackson, CBOCS 
West, and Gomez-Perez do not mean that the Court will imply 
retaliation protection only in discrimination cases. Instead, they could 
be interpreted to mean that discrimination claims present only one 
example of the types of claims that also need antiretaliation protection 
in order to be effectively enforced.  
Of course, the Court’s further focus on retaliation in the Title VII 
discrimination context merely provides another example of a law in 
which retaliation protection is required for the law’s enforcement. In 
those cases, however, the protection was explicit rather than implicit, 
and the issues involved how broadly that protection should be read.  
Moreover, in the context of the Court’s other retaliation 
jurisprudence, the Court’s recent statements related to the broader 
Antiretaliation Principle become meaningful. Over the course of the 
last fifty years, the Court has made these same types of statements in 
cases involving a variety of topics in addition to discrimination. As 
noted above, the Court utilized the Principle by upholding broad 
retaliation protection in cases involving the First Amendment,325 wage 
claims,326 labor relations,327 nuclear-environmental safety 
                                                                                                                 
322 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174; see CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1960–61 (rejecting the dissent’s 
argument that retaliation and discrimination are distinct); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937 
(noting that in Jackson, the dissent’s argument in favor of distinct categories for “retaliation” 
and “discrimination” did not succeed).  
323 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
(2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006). 
324 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006). 
325 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (holding that school teachers 
should be able to speak freely about matters of public concern without fear of retaliation). 
326 See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292–93 (1960) (holding 
that employers may not retaliate against employees who lawfully complain about substandard 
working conditions, and that employees who are fired for their lawful complaints are entitled to 
back wages).  
327 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984) (holding that an employer’s 
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regulations,328 transportation-industry rules,329 and witness 
testimony.330 The Court’s protection of whistleblowers goes well 
beyond those who report only discrimination. In each of those 
instances, the Court’s rationale relates to the importance of these 
employees’ reports for law-enforcement efforts more generally. 
In seeming juxtaposition to the approach the Court took in the 
statutory cases, the result in the lone First Amendment decision 
substantially narrowed retaliation protection. Indeed, the Court’s 2006 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos provided the first example of the 
Court denying First Amendment protection to an employee who 
complained about arguably illegal conduct.331 As noted above, 
although the employee’s speech (the complaint about governmental 
misconduct) related to a “matter of public concern” (the possible 
existence of governmental misconduct in the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s Office), the Court held that the First Amendment 
did not protect the employee from retaliation because the speech was 
made pursuant to his official duties.332  
To a limited degree, however, Garcetti provides yet another 
example of the Court explaining antiretaliation protection through the 
lens of the Antiretaliation Principle. At the same time that the Court 
implemented a rule that undermined the Principle, the Garcetti Court 
also made explicit statements in support of the Principle. For 
example, the Court identified the importance of balancing the 
                                                                                                                 
 
reporting of an illegal alien employee to the INS, in direct retaliation for that employee’s joining 
of a labor union, constitutes unlawful employer conduct under the National Labor Relations 
Act); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) (holding that it is an 
unlawful labor practice for employers to prosecute baseless, intentionally retaliatory lawsuits 
against employees who are availing themselves of the National Labor Relations Act, and that 
such lawsuits may be enjoined); NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121–22, 125 (1972) (holding 
that it is a violation of the National Labor Relations Act for an employer to fire an employee 
because the employee gave sworn, written statements to the NLRB). 
328 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (holding that the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, which prohibits retaliation by a nuclear industry employer against 
employees who report nuclear safety violations, does not forbid employees from seeking state-
law remedies for alleged employer retaliation). 
329 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (holding that the 
Railway Labor Act does not preempt the state-law wrongful-discharge claim of an aircraft 
mechanic who reported his safety concerns to the Federal Aviation Administration); Brock v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1987) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) 
(discussing that the purpose behind section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 
1982 was to provide significant antiretaliation protections to transportation industry workers 
because of their knowledge of an employer’s motor vehicle safety violations). 
330 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 (1998) (holding that an at-will employee 
may file a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) if the employee is fired to deter him 
from testifying at an upcoming federal criminal trial).  
331 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
332 Id. at 413–15, 419–22.  
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employee and employer interests with the “public’s interest in 
receiving the well-informed views of government employees 
engaging in civic discussion.”333 
That said, the Court seems to have strayed from the Antiretaliation 
Principle in Garcetti because, despite giving lip service to the 
importance of society’s interest in employee speech,334 it heavily 
weighted the government’s need for managerial control over its 
workforce and provided no actual discussion of the weight to be given 
to society’s specific interest in law enforcement.335  
The Antiretaliation Principle normally would call for the 
protection of an employee who reports illegal conduct, even if that 
reporting was part of the employee’s job duties. Job duties would 
make no doctrinal difference if the Court is truly focused on the 
Antiretaliation Principle in the decision. A rule that is more consistent 
with the Principle articulated in the rest of the Court’s retaliation 
jurisprudence would recognize that speech related to illegal 
government conduct lies at the heart of First Amendment protection. 
Society’s interest in knowing about the government’s unlawful 
behavior should be weighed heavily in favor of protection from 
retaliation, particularly because, like the other contexts discussed 
above, government employees have unique access to information 
about illegalities.  
In his dissent in Garcetti, Justice Souter set out a rule that more 
appropriately incorporates the Antiretaliation Principle into the 
Court’s Pickering balancing. Justice Souter argued, “private and 
public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to 
health and safety can outweigh the government [employer]’s stake in 
effective implementation of policy.”336 When employee speech relates 
to job duties, typically the government’s need for managerial 
authority would outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake.337 
According to Justice Souter, however, when the employee “speaks on 
                                                                                                                 
333 Id. at 419; see also id. at 420 (“The [Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . have sought both 
to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens 
on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to 
perform their important public functions.”); cf. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 
(2004) (per curiam) (“Were [public employees] not able to speak on [the operations of their 
employers], the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. 
The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the 
employee’s own right to disseminate it.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale disincentive to Government 
employees’ expression also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear 
what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”). 
334 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419–20. 
335 Id. at 422–23. 
336 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
337 Id. at 435. 
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a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of 
responsibility in the way he does it,” then the employee should be 
protected under the First Amendment.338 Justice Souter defined “a 
matter of unusual importance” to include speech related to “official 
dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious 
wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”339 His examples of such 
speech relate to reports of illegal conduct, including when “a public 
auditor speaks on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds, 
when a building inspector makes an obligatory report of an attempt to 
bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer expressly balks at a 
superior’s order to violate constitutional rights he is sworn to 
protect.”340 In other words, Justice Souter agreed with the job-duty 
rule generally, but understood it should be limited because of the 
Antiretaliation Principle’s protection of speech related to law 
enforcement, even if the speech was part of one’s job duty. Justice 
Souter’s exception for employee reports of illegal government 
behavior would better comply with the Court’s long history of 
support for the Antiretaliation Principle. 
Importantly, Garcetti ultimately confirms the Court’s belief that 
the Antiretaliation Principle should be implemented by Congress, 
instead of by the Court through constitutional interpretation. One of 
the reasons the Court offered to support its Garcetti holding was that 
there existed a “powerful network of legislative enactments—such as 
whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to those 
who seek to expose wrongdoing.”341  
Indeed, the Court has used a similar justification for reduced First 
Amendment protection in the employment setting. In Waters v. 
Churchill,342 the Court noted in a plurality opinion authored by Justice 
O’Connor that legislatures could extend stronger antiretaliation 
protections to their employees “beyond what is mandated by the First 
Amendment, out of respect for the values underlying the First 
Amendment, values central to our social order as well as our legal 
system.”343 Also, in Bush v. Lucas,344 the Court specifically denied a 
First Amendment damages claim to federal employees because 
Congress had created statutory protections from retaliation under the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.345 Thus, the constitutional cases 
                                                                                                                 
338 Id. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 433. 
341 Id. at 425 (majority opinion). 
342 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
343 Id. at 674 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
344 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
345 Id. at 389 (“In the past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level 
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linguistically support the Antiretaliation Principle, but they also often 
demonstrate the Court’s understanding that it is primarily a statutory, 
not a constitutional, principle. 
In sum, all the recent retaliation cases demonstrate that the 
Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence is about law enforcement. 
Employees must be protected from retaliation so that they will report 
illegal conduct. These employee reports will themselves aid law 
enforcement by alerting authorities to wrongdoing. As important, the 
threat of possible employee reports will deter employer violations in 
the first place. That being said, the Garcetti opinion seems to confirm 
the Court’s longstanding view that this antiretaliation protection more 
appropriately arises out of statutory, rather than constitutional, law.  
III. THE FUTURE 
Identifying and explaining the Supreme Court’s rationale in 
retaliation cases should impact how the Supreme Court and lower 
courts approach retaliation law in the future. 
A. The Supreme Court 
First, and most immediately, the Supreme Court appears interested 
in continuing its recent examination of retaliation law. The Court 
recently granted certiorari in two more statutory retaliation cases: 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. and Thompson v. 
North American Stainless, LP. The Antiretaliation Principle could 
directly influence the outcome of these important cases.  
Kasten involves the question of whether the Fair Labor Standard 
Act’s antiretaliation provision protects an employee who files an oral 
complaint that an employer violated the FLSA.346 In the lower courts, 
the case turned on how to interpret the FLSA’s protection of an 
employee who “has filed any complaint.”347 Both the district court 
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that this statutory 
language protects only a written complaint, not an oral complaint.348 
                                                                                                                 
 
Government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might 
improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates’ freedom of expression.”). 
346 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at i. 
347 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); see Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
570 F.3d 834, 837–40 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010); Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12 (W.D. Wis. 2008), aff’d, 570 
F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010). 
348 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840; Kasten, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
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Decisions by several other circuit courts, however, have protected 
employees who made oral complaints about FLSA violations.349  
Thompson examines whether Title VII prohibits retaliation against 
an employee by “inflicting reprisals” on a third party who is closely 
related to the employee.350 In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he 
was fired because his fiancée engaged in conduct protected by Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision.351 The District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky entered summary judgment in favor of the 
employer, concluding that Title VII “by its plain language does not 
permit third party retaliation claims.”352 A panel of the Sixth Circuit 
reversed,353 but then a divided en banc circuit court overturned the 
panel’s decision.354 The majority pointed out that Title VII’s 
retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee 
“because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”355 Relying on what it 
viewed to be the “plain and unambiguous statutory text” of Title VII’s 
retaliation provision, the court found that Title VII protects only 
individuals who themselves engaged in protected conduct.356 Because 
Thompson did not engage in the protected conduct himself, the 
majority ruled that he could not bring a retaliation claim for his own 
discharge.357 
At first glance, both cases present relatively pedestrian statutory-
interpretation issues. In Kasten, the Court must decide between 
                                                                                                                 
349 E.g., EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. 
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 
121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987). 
350 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at i. 
351 See id. at 3 (alleging that Thompson, the plaintiff, was fired because his fiancée, who 
also worked for the defendant, had filed a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC).  
352 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d en 
banc, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). 
353 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc, 
567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542. 
354 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542. Nine judges joined in the majority opinion, one judge delivered a 
separate concurrence in the result, and six judges filed a total of three dissenting opinions. Id. at 
805; id. at 816 (Rogers, J., concurring in the result); id. at 818 (Martin, J., dissenting); id. at 820 
(Moore, J., dissenting); id. at 826 (White, J., dissenting). 
355 Id. at 807 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
356 Id. at 805. 
357 See id. at 808 (“By application of the plain language of the statute, [the plaintiff] is not 
included in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action because 
he personally did not oppose an unlawful employment practice, make a charge, testify, assist, or 
participate in an investigation.”). 
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competing interpretations of the statutory terms “file” and 
“complaint.” In their briefs, the two sides each offered several 
dictionary definitions of the terms to support their arguments.358 
Moreover, each side presented the Court with language from 
numerous other statutes that support its position regarding the scope 
of the provision’s protection.359  
Similarly, Thompson ostensibly presents two competing 
interpretative views of Title VII’s language. As the Sixth Circuit and 
other circuits have found, Title VII’s retaliation provision focuses on 
discrimination against the person (“he”) who has opposed unlawful 
activity or participated in Title VII activities.360 Another interpretation 
of Title VII’s “plain language,” however, could lead to a dramatically 
different result.  
In her dissenting opinion in Thompson, Judge White noted that 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision merely describes an “unlawful 
employment practice”361 and does not identify who receives 
protection from such practices.362 Instead, according to Judge White, 
Title VII answers that second question in a different section, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which provides that any person who claims to 
be “aggrieved” by an employer’s unlawful employment practice can 
file a claim with the EEOC.363 Additionally, § 2000e-5(f)(1) permits 
                                                                                                                 
358 Petitioner’s Brief at 22 nn.10–11, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1890 (June 16, 2010) (No. 09-834), 2010 WL 2481867 (using a number of 
dictionaries to define the phrase “to file”); Brief for Respondent at 19–20, Kasten, 130 S. Ct. 
1890 (Aug. 16, 2010) (No. 09-834), 2010 WL 3251632 (using various dictionaries to define 
“file” and “complaint”). 
359 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 358, at 24–30; Brief for Respondent, supra note 358, 
at 12, 34–36. 
360 See, e.g., Thompson, 567 F.3d at 807–08 (declining to create a cause of action under 
Title VII for retaliation against third parties who had not engaged in statutorily protected 
activity); Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir. 2002) (analyzing similar 
language in the ADA and ADEA, and concluding that “the statutes are unambiguous—indeed, it 
is hard to imagine a clearer way of specifying that the individual who was discriminated against 
must also be the individual who engaged in protected activity”); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 
151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (looking to “plain language” of Title VII to conclude that 
plaintiffs who bring antiretaliation claims must have personally engaged in protected conduct); 
Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that under the “plain 
language” of the ADEA, plaintiffs may file antiretaliation suits only if they have faced 
discrimination for personally engaging in protected activity). 
361 Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827 (White, J., dissenting). 
362 Id. (“Because the language of § 704(a) addresses what is forbidden, rather than who is 
protected, the majority must make an inference to reach its conclusion that § 704(a) tells us who 
is and is not protected against the actions it prohibits, and then, more importantly, deduce from 
that inference who may and may not maintain a cause of action.”).  
363 Id. at 828. Interestingly, Judge Rogers’s concurrence reached a conclusion similar to 
Judge White’s about the relationship between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-5(b), but Rogers 
interpreted § 2000e-5(b) to permit only “those persons who are the intended beneficiaries” of 
Title VII to bring claims, which he declared did not include third parties. Id. at 817 (Rogers, J., 
concurring in the result). 
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lawsuits to be filed “by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”364 Thus, 
under this analysis, North American Stainless committed an unlawful 
employment practice by retaliating against Thompson’s fiancée 
through its firing of Thompson.365 Because Thompson was 
“aggrieved” by this act, § 2000e-5 permits Thompson to file a claim 
against North American Stainless.366 In his Supreme Court brief, 
Thompson has adopted this statutory argument as his primary 
rationale for overturning the Sixth Circuit’s decision.367 
In short, as with the other recent retaliation cases, both Kasten and 
Thompson will require the Court to choose between strong linguistic 
and statutory interpretation arguments on either side.368 Despite the 
claims of judges and advocates on either side of these debates, the 
“plain language” of the FLSA and Title VII simply do not answer the 
questions these cases present. Ultimately, then, the Antiretaliation 
Principle may tip the balance, as it did in Jackson, Burlington 
Northern, CBOCS West, Gomez-Perez, and Crawford, in which 
similarly strong interpretative arguments could be made regarding the 
applicability of retaliation protection. As in those cases, older 
retaliation precedent examining the purpose of antiretaliation 
protections should loom large.  
With regard to Kasten, the Supreme Court stated fifty years ago 
that, consistent with the Antiretaliation Principle, the purpose of the 
FLSA’s antiretaliation provision was to encourage employees to 
report violations of the law:  
                                                                                                                 
364 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006). 
365 Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827–28 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that an employer can 
commit an unlawful employment practice against an opposing employee by firing that 
employee’s coemployee, fiancé(e), or spouse in retaliation). 
366 Id. at 828–29. 
367 Brief for Petitioner at 7–9, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (Sept. 3, 
2010) (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 3501186. Interestingly, the courts that upheld third-party claims 
prior to Thompson typically ignored this type of statutory argument and, instead, relied on an 
analysis of the broad purposes behind antiretaliation provisions. See, e.g., McDonnell v. 
Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A] literal interpretation of [Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision] would leave a gaping hole in the protection of complainants and 
witnesses.”); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding a third-
party retaliation claim under ERISA because a more narrow construction would “clash[] against 
the congressional intent of protecting participants and beneficiaries in the exercise of rights 
under an ERISA plan”); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 
1987) (holding that the NLRA prohibited retaliation against third parties because, without such 
protection, covered employees would remain silent out of fear that their employer would seek 
revenge against their coemployee relatives); De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 
(D.D.C. 1978) (noting that failing to protect a third party under Title VII would produce “absurd 
and unjust results”); see also John J. Feeney, Comment, An Inevitable Progression in the Scope 
of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision: Third-Party Retaliation Claims, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 
643, 655 (2010) (discussing the EEOC’s support for third-party retaliation claims under Title 
VII). 
368 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not 
seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards through 
continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of 
payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and 
complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate 
rights claimed to have been denied. . . . By the proscription of 
retaliatory acts . . . Congress sought to foster a climate in 
which compliance with the substantive provisions of the 
[FLSA] would be enhanced.369 
Enforcement of the law requires employees to report FLSA 
violations, which necessitates broad antiretaliation protection.370  
Moreover, in NLRB v. Scrivener, decided almost forty years ago, 
the Court relied upon the Principle to interpret a similar provision of 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to protect employees who 
gave informal statements to investigators, even though the NLRA’s 
plain language seemed to narrowly limit protection only to employees 
who “[have] filed charges or given testimony.”371 The Scrivener 
Court decided to do exactly what the employee in Kasten asks the 
Court to do now: understand the importance of protecting employees 
during all phases of the enforcement process, including the initial 
report of illegality, and, therefore, to look beyond the statute’s plain, 
but limited, language.372 
Additionally, failing to protect oral complaints could significantly 
impact the effectiveness of a decade-long attempt to encourage 
employees to report illegal conduct through the use of employee 
hotlines.373 This recent trend involves employers providing employees 
a consistent way to make internal complaints about illegal 
behavior.374 As two prominent academics have noted, “[I]f internal 
                                                                                                                 
369 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
370 See id. (noting that effective enforcement requires that employees feel free to report 
grievances to officials). 
371 NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
372 Id. at 124 (“It would make less than complete sense to protect the employee because he 
participates in the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or the in the final, formal 
presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important developmental stages that fall 
between these two points in time.”). 
373 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1138–41 (2006) (analyzing the ability of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Structural Model to encourage and protect corporate employee whistleblowers). 
374 See id. (describing the specific methods through which Sarbanes-Oxley allows for more 
employee whistleblowing); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, 
Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and 
Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 281 (1991) (noting that courts recognize that employees who 
discover health and safety violations are likely to first notify management of these problems). 
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disclosures are not protected, reporting of wrongdoing would be 
reduced as unaddressed retaliation deters potential whistleblowers and 
leads to the laws not being as effectively enforced.”375 Indeed, 
protecting oral internal reports makes sense if the goal is to increase 
reporting. Social science studies, for example, suggest that most 
reports of wrongdoing begin as internal reports.376 The Supreme 
Court has been protective of internal reports as well. In addition to 
Crawford, which focused on the issue,377 the Court has noted in the 
constitutional context that the First Amendment protects internal 
reports as well as external whistleblowing.378 In fact, federal courts 
and the Secretary of Labor have interpreted other statutes to protect 
internal whistleblowers, even when the statute’s language appears to 
protect only external whistleblowers.379  
More specifically, providing methods to orally report wrongdoing 
has become part of the law-enforcement landscape that encourages 
internal reporting of wrongdoing.380 Congress and administrative 
agencies have required companies to provide employees a means to 
report illegal conduct.381 Indeed, most companies, spurred by these 
laws and court rulings, provide telephone hotlines for employees to 
orally report a broad range of wrongdoing, including both illegal and 
unethical conduct.382 Thus, it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to 
think only about protecting the formal initiation of a complaint 
                                                                                                                 
375 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 374, at 281. 
376 See id. at 299 (noting that in the context of sociopsychological research, internal 
whistleblowing is preferable to external reporting); Moberly, supra note 373, at 1142 
(discussing how employees prefer internal reporting to external reporting as a way to preserve 
and demonstrate employer loyalty). 
377 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 
(2009) (holding that an employee may receive Title VII antiretaliation protection when 
reporting discrimination, not on her own initiative, but during an employer’s internal 
investigation). 
378 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“Employees in some cases may 
receive First Amendment protection for expressions made at work.”); Givhan v. W. Line 
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (“The First Amendment forbids abridgment of 
the ‘freedom of speech.’ Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this 
freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his 
employer rather than to spread his views before the public. We decline to adopt such a view of 
the First Amendment.”). 
379 See, e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 
478–479 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the Clean Water Act’s antiretaliation protections apply to 
employees who make internal complaints to their employers); KOHN, supra note 26, at 251 
(noting that the Secretary of Labor “adheres to its longstanding doctrine that internal 
whistleblowing is fully protected” in environmental and nuclear whistleblowers cases). 
380 See Moberly, supra note 373, at 1138–41, 1151 (discussing how the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Structural Model encourages internal whistleblowing). 
381 See Moberly, supra note 131, at 988–95 (describing the evolution of corporate codes of 
business conduct, and how and why these codes provide employee antiretaliation protections). 
382 See id. at 1030 (noting, in response to Sarbanes-Oxley, many companies publicly post 
the phone number for their respective whistleblower hotlines). 
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directly with a law-enforcement agency. In fact, the Seventh Circuit 
itself recognized this reality in Kasten by noting that, despite the 
FLSA’s language, written complaints to an employer (as opposed to 
only the government) would constitute protected conduct.383 The 
circuit court did not draw a distinction between internal and external 
complaints; rather, the court distinguished between written and oral 
complaints to an employer. 
The Supreme Court, however, has never been interested in such 
nuanced and nitpicky distinctions when evaluating antiretaliation 
provisions, particularly in older retaliation statutes, because such 
distinctions undermine enforcement of the law.384 Given the increased 
importance of internal reporting, and the encouragement of oral 
internal reporting through the pervasive use of employee hotlines, the 
Court would severely hamper FLSA law-enforcement efforts if it 
decided in Kasten to deny antiretaliation protection to employees who 
make oral reports. The FLSA, in particular, depends heavily on 
employee reports for its enforcement,385 and an employee can play an 
essential part in the Act’s enforcement through oral as well as written 
action.386 For example, the Department of Labor advertises a phone 
number for employees to call with concerns about FLSA violations, 
thereby explicitly encouraging oral reports and complaints.387  
                                                                                                                 
383 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837–38 (7th Cir. 
2009), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010). 
384 As the Court noted in NLRB v. Scrivener: 
An employee who participates in a Board investigation may not be called 
formally to testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could testify. 
His contribution might be merely cumulative or the case may be settled or dismissed 
before hearing. Which employees receive statutory protection should not turn on the 
vagaries of the selection process or on other events that have no relation to the need 
for protection. It would make less than complete sense to protect the employee 
because he participates in the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or 
in the final, formal presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important 
developmental stages that fall between these two points in time. This would be 
unequal and inconsistent protection and is not the protection needed to preserve the 
integrity of the Board process in its entirety. 
405 U.S. 117, 123–24 (1972); see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 
Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 851 (2009) (broadly construing the “opposition” clause of Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision to include an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal 
investigation).  
385 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (describing 
Congress’ purposeful reliance on employee complaints to ensure effective enforcement of the 
FLSA). 
386 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 585 F.3d 310, 317 (7th Cir. 
2009) (Rovner, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Oral inquiries, protests, 
and information supplied to an agency representative play no less an important role in the 
statutory scheme than do letters, e-mails, and sworn statements. They must be protected as 
well.”), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010). 
387 The Wage and Hour Division call center phone number is displayed on the U.S. 
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division’s website and on posters that are legally required 
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The Sixth Circuit’s cramped reading of Title VII in Thompson will 
also undermine law enforcement (and thus the Supreme Court’s 
Antiretaliation Principle). During the past half century, the Court 
consistently has permitted a wide range of plaintiffs to bring 
retaliation lawsuits because of the devastating “chilling” effect 
retaliation can have on future employer misconduct reports. Most 
obviously, as noted above,388 the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co. relied on the purpose behind Title VII’s retaliation provision 
to conclude that the statute protected former employees as well as 
current employees.389 Without this protection, the Supreme Court 
recognized that victims of discrimination would be deterred from 
complaining to the EEOC.390  
In fact, many retaliation statutes contain vague language about 
their scope of protection, and the Court has broadly interpreted these 
statutes to allow a wide range of individuals to bring retaliation 
claims, including: third parties who report statutory violations,391 at-
will employees,392 elected union officials against their union,393 and 
illegal aliens.394 In each instance, the Court’s holding demonstrated its 
understanding that the enforcement of these laws depended on the 
granting of antiretaliation protections to a broad range of individuals. 
It is not a far leap from protecting individuals who might report 
misconduct to protecting the relatives and friends of those who report. 
Indeed, courts seem to understand that an effective way to chill 
reporting would be for employers to retaliate against people close to 
                                                                                                                 
 
to be displayed in workplaces. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE POSTER (2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs 
/compliance/posters/minwage.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/contact_us.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).  
388 See supra text accompanying notes 41–46. 
389 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (“[A] primary purpose of [Title 
VII’s] antiretaliation provisions[ is] [m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms.”).  
390 Id.  
391 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that a white 
property owner had standing to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim after a homeowners’ association 
had retaliated against him for leasing his house to a black man). 
392 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 (1998) (holding that an at-will employee 
may file a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) if the employee is fired to deter him 
from testifying at an upcoming federal criminal trial).  
393 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (holding that 
the removal of a local union’s elected business agent, by a representative of the international 
union, in retaliation for the local agent’s speech, violated Title I of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959). 
394 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984) (holding that an employer’s 
reporting of an illegal alien employee to the INS, in direct retaliation for that employee joining a 
labor union, constitutes unlawful employer conduct under the National Labor Relations Act). 
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those reporting. As noted by the Seventh Circuit—and often repeated 
by others395—“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his 
family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the 
field of labor relations.”396 Even courts that ultimately dismiss third-
party claims based on Title VII’s “plain language” have accepted this 
reality. For example, after rejecting a third-party ADEA claim, the 
Third Circuit noted: 
The anti-retaliation provisions recognize that enforcement of 
anti-discrimination laws depends in large part on employees 
to initiate administrative and judicial proceedings. There can 
be no doubt that an employer who retaliates against the 
friends and relatives of employees who initiate anti-
discrimination proceedings will deter employees from 
exercising their protected rights. . . . Allowing employers to 
retaliate via friends and family, therefore, would appear to be 
in significant tension with the overall purpose of the anti-
retaliation provisions, which are intended to promote the 
reporting, investigation, and correction of discriminatory 
conduct in the workplace.397  
Protecting third-party victims of retaliation would follow easily 
from the Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, particularly as the Court 
applied the Principle in Burlington Northern and in Robinson. The 
Supreme Court already recognized in Burlington Northern that 
retaliation can take many forms, and thus the law should prohibit a 
wide range of retaliatory activity.398 Moreover, Robinson recognized 
                                                                                                                 
395 See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568–69 (3d Cir. 2002) (“There 
can be no doubt that an employer who retaliates against the friends and relatives of employees 
who initiate anti-discrimination proceedings will deter employees from exercising their 
protected rights.”); Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 410–11 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(ordering the reinstatement and backpay of an employee who had been fired because of her 
relatives’ participation in a successful union organizing campaign). See generally Alex B. Long, 
The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in 
the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931 (2007) (analyzing third party retaliation claims in the 
context of an employee’s right to associate with coworkers). 
396 NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987). 
397 Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568–69. But see Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 
819 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding a broad interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, which 
would cover third parties who had not personally engaged in protected activity, is neither 
supported by Title VII’s plain language nor necessary to protect third parties, such as spouses, 
from retaliation).  
398 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (concluding that 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision covers any employer action that would be materially adverse 
to a reasonable employee or job applicant). 
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that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must protect people other 
than “employees” in order to be effective.399  
Kasten and Thompson will give the Court further opportunities to 
apply the Antiretaliation Principle and to enhance employee law-
enforcement efforts. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
these cases could have broad implications because several federal 
laws contain antiretaliation provisions with similar language to the 
FLSA and Title VII.400 If the Supreme Court continues its historic and 
recent reliance on the Antiretaliation Principle, then it should reverse 
the lower courts’ limited views of retaliation protection because their 
decisions weaken law-enforcement efforts.  
B. Lower Courts 
The Antiretaliation Principle can serve a second important role, 
directed at lower courts. The Principle’s emphasis on law 
                                                                                                                 
399 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (finding that an interpretation of 
Title VII that does not recognize former employees as “employees” would undermine the 
purpose behind the act’s antiretaliation provisions by barring an entire subset of actions allowed 
under Title VII, such as discriminatory termination). 
400 For statutes with language similar to the FLSA language at issue in Kasten, see Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978 § 701, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(4) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against 
a federal employee “because the employee has filed a complaint, affidavit, or petition, or has 
given any information under this chapter”); Foreign Service Act of 1980 § 1015(a)(4), 22 
U.S.C. § 4115(a)(4) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination or punishment of an employee “because 
the employee has filed a complaint or petition, or has given any information, affidavit, or 
testimony under this subchapter”); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c)(1), 29 
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee “because such employee 
has filed any complaint”); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act § 505(a), 
29 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (2006) (prohibiting coercion or discrimination against “any migrant or 
seasonal agricultural worker because such worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint”); 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 § 3(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 2002(4)(A) (2006) 
(prohibiting retaliation against an employee because that employee has filed any complaint); 
Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 184(f), 29 U.S.C. § 2934(f) (2006) (requiring the Secretary 
of Labor to take action or order “corrective measures” if an employee subject to protection 
under this chapter is discharged “because such individual has filed any complaint”); Railway 
Labor Act 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(3) (Supp. II 2009) (prohibiting railroad carriers from retaliating 
against an employee if that retaliation is due “in whole or in part, to the employee’s lawful, good 
faith act done, or perceived by the employer to have been done or about to be done . . . to file a 
complaint”); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 
2009) (prohibiting retaliation against a commercial motor vehicle employee if “the employee, or 
another person at the employee’s request, has filed a complaint . . . related to a violation of 
commercial motor vehicle safety”). For statutes with language similar to the Title VII language 
at issue in Thompson, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against “any individual . . . because such 
individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section”); Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an 
employee “for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee 
benefit plan” or for testifying against the employer in a proceeding); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against 
an individual for “his or her having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by 
this chapter”). 
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enforcement provides lower courts the proper perspective from which 
to evaluate retaliation cases. Rather than view retaliation cases as a 
one-on-one battle of an employee versus an employer, the Principle 
invites and requires consideration of society’s broader interest in law 
enforcement. The Principle also explicitly recognizes the role that 
employees can play in providing information that enhances the 
enforcement of society’s laws. 
Thus, when courts examine an employee’s retaliation claim, they 
should consider explicitly whether protecting the employee from 
retaliation would encourage other employees to come forward with 
information about illegal conduct, and whether that information 
actually would help law-enforcement efforts. This perspective might 
affect several different areas of retaliation law that courts currently 
debate when examining statutory antiretaliation provisions as well as 
the common law of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. I 
will address two such areas in this Section. 
1. Causation 
First, in recent years, courts increasingly have scrutinized the level 
of causation required for a plaintiff to prove that an employer’s 
retaliation was caused by an employee’s protected conduct. The 
typical retaliation case requires the plaintiff to prove three primary 
elements: (1) that the employee engaged in protected conduct; (2) that 
the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that the 
employee’s engagement in a protected activity caused the adverse 
employment action.401  
As explained below, “but for” causation could be required, or 
perhaps some lower standard (such as requiring that protected 
conduct be a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in the adverse 
employment action). 
Because of this “causation ambiguity,” courts have examined and 
disagreed about the level of causation required in retaliation cases.402 
                                                                                                                 
401 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1133 (describing the three prima facie elements of a 
Title VII retaliation claim). Some scholars, however, believe that there are more than three 
prima facie elements in an antiretaliation claim. For example, Westman and Modesitt believe 
that there are four prima facie elements of a typical antiretaliation claim: (1) that the employee 
has engaged in protected activity; (2) that the employer knew that the employee had engaged in 
the protected activity; (3) that the employee has suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) 
that there is a causal connection between the employee’s protected conduct and the adverse 
employment action. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119, at 230 
402 Compare Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recently clarified that unless a federal statute provides 
otherwise, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating but-for causation in suits brought 
under federal law.”), and Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In 
demonstrating causation, the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have been 
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Many older antiretaliation provisions express their causation standard 
by prohibiting retaliation “because of” various protected conduct.403 
Although one reading of this language would suggest that “but for” 
causation is required, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy 
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, stated that the 
proper standard in a First Amendment retaliation case was whether 
the protected conduct was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in 
the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action404—a 
lower standard of proof for the employee than “but for” causation. As 
the Court noted, “A borderline or marginal candidate should not have 
the employment question resolved against him because of 
constitutionally protected conduct.”405 
Although Mt. Healthy was a constitutional case, the Supreme 
Court has examined causation language in employment statutes as 
well. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,406 a Title VII “mixed motive” 
discrimination case, a majority of the Court required the plaintiff to 
show that his or her protected status was a motivating factor in the 
employer’s adverse decision.407 In other words, the Court interpreted 
                                                                                                                 
 
taken ‘but for’ the assertion of FLSA rights.”), with Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 334 
(5th Cir. 2010) (using “motivating factor” or “mixed-motive” causation standards in a Title VII 
antiretaliation claim), and Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that ‘the decision-maker[s] [were] 
aware of the protected conduct,’ and ‘that the protected activity and the adverse action were not 
wholly unrelated.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 
F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999))).  
403 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 58(a)(4) (2006) 
(prohibiting retaliation against an employee “because he has filed charges or given testimony 
under this subchapter”); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) 
(2006) (prohibiting the discrimination or discharge of an employee “because such employee has 
filed any complaint”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee because the employee has opposed 
an unlawful action or because the employee participated in an investigation); Civil Rights Act of 
1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation “because [an employee] 
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting 
retaliation against an employee because that employee has made a charge, testifies, or assists in 
an investigation related to the employer’s unlawful conduct). 
404 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
405 Id. at 286. The Court also held that the employer should have an affirmative defense if 
it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same 
employment decision “in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id. at 287. 
406 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
407 A “mixed motive” discrimination case, such as Price Waterhouse, involves an 
allegation that an employer took an adverse employment action against an employee because of 
both permissible and impermissible considerations. Id. According to Price Waterhouse, an 
employer can still prevail on the employee’s Title VII claim it if can prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that it would have made the same employment decision had it not taken the 
plaintiff’s protected status into account. Id. at 242.  
Although Price Waterhouse did not result in a single majority opinion, six justices agreed 
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the “because of” language in Title VII to mean “was a motivating 
factor in.” After the plaintiff satisfied this “motivating factor” burden, 
the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that 
the employer would have taken the same adverse employment action 
even if it had not considered the prohibited factor (such as race or 
gender)408—a similar affirmative defense to the one set forth in Mt. 
Healthy for First Amendment retaliation cases.409 Satisfying this 
burden provided the employer a complete affirmative defense to the 
employee’s discrimination claim.410  
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress enshrined this mixed-
motive analysis, and its accompanying “motivating factor” causation 
standard, in Title VII’s statutory language regarding discrimination.411 
Subsequently, Congress lowered even further the employee’s 
causation burden in whistleblower antiretaliation provisions by 
adopting a “contributing factor” standard,412 indicating a substantial 
congressional preference for this lower burden of proof.  
                                                                                                                 
 
that the “motivating” or “substantial” factor standard was the proper standard. Id. at 258 
(plurality opinion) (adopting the “motivating” factor standard); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (stating that the plaintiff’s burden is “to show that the unlawful motive was a 
substantial factor in the adverse employment action”); id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (stating that the plaintiff must show by direct evidence that his or her protected 
status played a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision); see also Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009) (reiterating the “causation” holdings in Price 
Waterhouse). 
408 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he defendant may avoid a 
finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made 
the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”).  
409 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (noting that after the plaintiff satisfies its initial burden by 
showing that he or she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show by the preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same 
employment decision absent the plaintiff’s protected conduct). 
410 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding that the defendant can avoid liability 
by proving that it would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff’s gender). 
411 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (establishing that an unlawful hiring practice has 
taken place when “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”). The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 also adopted the affirmative defense set forth in Price Waterhouse, but only 
permitted the defense to relieve the employer of liability for certain damages claims. See id. 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing that where a violation is established under this section and the 
employer demonstrates that it would have taken the employment action “in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor,” then the court may award only declaratory relief, injunctive 
relief in certain circumstances, and certain costs and attorney’s fees). Congress utilized language 
similar to that in Price Waterhouse in a provision prohibiting retaliation against employees who 
take leave from employment to serve in the military. See Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 § 2(a), 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (2006) (prohibiting 
discrimination against employees where an employee’s leave for military service is a motivating 
factor, unless the employer would have made the same decision absent that motivating factor).  
412 A whistleblower must prove that his protected conduct was only a “contributing factor” 
in the adverse employment action taken against him. See, e.g., Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21) § 519(a), 49 U.S.C. 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, did not resolve the debate 
around the meaning of the “because of” language, since it applies 
only to Title VII’s discrimination section (not the antiretaliation 
provision). Older antiretaliation provisions still utilize the “because 
of” language, and lower courts have struggled with the level of 
causation required by these older antiretaliation statutes, including 
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the False 
Claims Act.413 Some courts, relying on Mt. Healthy or Price 
Waterhouse, interpreted the statutes to implicitly adopt the 
“motivating factor” standard (and also the complete affirmative 
defense for employers set forth in Price Waterhouse).414  
Complicating matters further, in a surprising 2009 decision in 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 
the “because of” language in the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) required a “but for” standard for its discrimination 
claims (the Court did not address retaliation claims explicitly).415 
Despite the fact that the ADEA was patterned after Title VII and the 
two statutes typically have been interpreted similarly, the Court’s 
rationale was that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied the 
“motivating factor” language only to Title VII’s discrimination 
provision.416 According to the Court, because Congress did not also 
amend the ADEA with this language, the more traditional “but for” 
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (requiring an employee filing a complaint under this act to 
demonstrate that the protected conduct was a “contributing factor” in the employment decision); 
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 § 6(a), 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) 
(requiring that the plaintiff filing a complaint under this act show that his or her protected 
conduct was a “contributing factor” in the employment decision). Other recent statutes have 
explicitly adopted the burden of proof standard annunciated in AIR 21. See, e.g., Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 803(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2006) (“An action brought under 
paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in [49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121(b)].”). 
413 See statutes cited supra note 400. 
414 See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(assuming the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive scheme applies to Title VII retaliation claims); 
Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We . . . conclude that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not change the Mt. Healthy/Price Waterhouse [causation and 
burden shifting] analysis applicable to retaliation claims under the [False Claims] Act . . . .”); 
Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552–54 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the Price 
Waterhouse mixed-motive scheme to a Title VII retaliation claim). 
415 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009) (“A plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was 
the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.”). 
416 Id. at 2349 (“Congress has since amended Title VII by explicitly authorizing 
discrimination claims in which an improper consideration was ‘a motivating factor’ for an 
adverse employment decision. This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework 
applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now.” (citations omitted)). 
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standard should apply to the ADEA’s “because of” language.417 In 
other words, the Court seemed to say that a statute’s use of the term 
“because of” should be interpreted to mean “but for” causation.418 
The Gross opinion seemed to close the door to any argument that 
“because of” language could mean “motivating factor,” rather than 
the “but for” standard for retaliation claims under Title VII, the 
ADEA, and other older statutes.419 Indeed, some circuit courts have 
interpreted Gross to apply “but for” causation to any federal statute 
that does not explicitly utilize some other standard.420  
In March 2010, however, the Fifth Circuit issued an unexpected 
opinion in Smith v. Xerox Corp.,421 finding that Title VII’s retaliation 
provision, coupled with the accompanying “motivating factor” 
language from Price Waterhouse, permitted a mixed-motive theory.422 
The employer in Smith argued that Gross’s reasoning should apply to 
Title VII retaliation cases because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did 
not amend the Title VII antiretaliation provision to include the 
“motivating factor” language.423 Therefore, according to the 
                                                                                                                 
417 Id. (“Congress neglected to add [a motivating-factor] provision to the ADEA when it 
amended Title VII . . . even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several 
ways.”). 
418 Id. at 2350–51 (holding that a plaintiff seeking relief under the ADEA must show that 
they would not have been fired but for their age). 
419 See statutes cited supra note 400. 
420 See, e.g., Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Gross makes clear that in the absence of any additional text bringing mixed-motive claims 
within the reach of the statute, the statute’s ‘because of’ language demands proof that a 
forbidden consideration . . . was a ‘but for’ cause of the adverse action complained of.”); Fairley 
v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525–26 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[Gross] holds that, unless a statute (such as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the 
plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”); see also Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 
719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 502–03 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying a “but-for” causation standard to an 
ADA retaliation claim and holding that Gross prohibits the use of a “mixed motive” standard for 
future ADA retaliation claims).  
In light of Gross, the lower courts appear to be reconsidering precedent that automatically 
applied Title VII’s burden-shifting schemes to other employment statutes by closely examining 
the language of various statutes to determine causation. Compare Hunter v. Valley View Local 
Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the FMLA permitted a “mixed-
motive” analysis based on the statute’s use of the term “interfere with” and the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of that term), with Rasic v. City of Northlake, No. 08-C-104, 2009 WL 
3150428, at *17–18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2009) (suggesting that the FMLA’s use of “for 
opposing” is not distinguishable from the ADEA’s use of “because of,” and, as a result, the 
FMLA probably mandates a “but for” causation standard). 
421 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).  
422 Id. at 330 (“Because we believe that Gross does not unequivocally control whether a 
mixed-motive jury instruction may be given in a Title VII retaliation case, we must continue to 
allow the Price Waterhouse burden shifting in such cases unless and until the Supreme Court 
says otherwise.”). 
423 Id. at 328 (“[The employer] urged . . . [that] a Title VII retaliation plaintiff, like an 
ADEA discrimination plaintiff, may not obtain a motivating factor jury instruction and must 
instead prove that retaliation was the but-for cause for the adverse employment action.”). 
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employer, Congress must have meant to keep the “but for” standard 
implied by the provision’s “because of” language.424 The court 
maintained, however, that Gross required courts to interpret Title VII 
and the ADEA differently, and that Price Waterhouse should still 
apply to Title VII retaliation cases.425 Because of Price Waterhouse’s 
application, the court concluded that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff 
could satisfy its burden of proof by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s 
protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in an adverse 
employment action.426 
To the extent that Gross can be limited in this manner—to apply 
only to age-discrimination claims—lower courts should utilize the 
Antiretaliation Principle to interpret retaliation statutes under the 
“motivating factor” standard. Retaliation cases almost always involve 
difficult decisions regarding mixed motives and retaliation, and a “but 
for” causation standard would be devastating to employees who blow 
the whistle on illegal conduct.  
Whistleblowers often are outspoken employees—in large part that 
is what makes them whistleblowers—and, as a result, their employers 
can perceive them as troublemakers. Accordingly, requiring that an 
employee prove that protected conduct is the only factor in a 
disciplinary action will be enormously difficult. Even under statutes 
that require only a “motivating factor” standard (or the lower 
“contributing factor” standard), some empirical evidence 
demonstrates that causation is notoriously difficult to prove.427 If 
lower courts take the Court’s Antiretaliation Principle seriously, then 
                                                                                                                 
424 Id.  
425 Id. at 330 (noting that Price Waterhouse still controlled Title VII antiretaliation-claim 
analysis because of the Supreme Court’s recognition in Gross that “Title VII and the ADEA are 
‘materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion’ (quoting Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009))). 
426 See id. at 326–30. The Fifth Circuit also overruled its own precedent to find that a Title 
VII plaintiff could satisfy the motivating-factor burden with either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. See id. at 331–32 (“The specific text of the Title VII retaliation provision, § 2000e-
3(a), prohibits an employer from discriminating ‘because’ the employee has, inter alia, made a 
charge against the employer. The statute provides no indication of the type of evidentiary 
showing necessary to prove the retaliation claim. Because the text of § 2000e-3(a) neither 
requires nor prohibits a specific evidentiary showing, construing it to include the mixed-motive 
framework to be shown by circumstantial evidence does no violence to the statute. Title VII 
does not affirmatively require direct evidence from a plaintiff, whether in a discrimination or 
retaliation context, and we can see no basis for requiring a heightened evidentiary showing in 
order to obtain a motivating factor jury instruction predicated only on the theory of liability 
alleged in the complaint (discrimination versus retaliation).” (footnotes omitted)). But see 
Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that direct evidence 
was required for a mixed-motive retaliation case to shift the burden to the defendant). 
427 See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 120–28 (2007) 
(analyzing the success rates of employees bringing Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims when 
courts address issues of causation). 
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they will look for ways to distinguish Gross and continue to apply the 
“motivating factor” language from the Court’s Price Waterhouse 
decision in retaliation cases. 
2. Reasonable Belief 
The Antiretaliation Principle also could influence lower courts 
when they determine whether a whistleblower had a “reasonable 
belief” that the reported employer conduct was actually illegal. The 
issue revolves around the “protected conduct” element of most 
retaliation and wrongful-discharge claims. This element requires the 
employee to have engaged in specifically protected conduct, which 
often involves reporting or opposing “any practice made unlawful” by 
the statute containing the antiretaliation provision.428 Courts could 
interpret this language to mean that the employee must report actual 
illegal conduct in order to be protected.429 In other words, if the 
employer’s actions were legal, the law would not protect an employee 
from retaliation for reporting the conduct under the mistaken, but 
reasonable, belief that the conduct was actually illegal.430 
Additionally, several common-law courts require an employee to 
report actual illegalities in order to state a claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.431 
Nevertheless, despite this potentially narrow protected conduct 
requirement, other courts have required employees only to 
                                                                                                                 
428 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
(2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who has “opposed any practice made 
unlawful by this section”); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2615(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation “against any individual for opposing any practice 
made unlawful by this subchapter”); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) 
(2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
§ 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an individual who “has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter”).  
429 See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119, at 82 (noting that both the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and the State of New York Court of Appeals have required whistleblowers to 
prove that their employers actually violated either state or federal law). 
430 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1140–41 (arguing that in Breeden, “the [Supreme] 
Court’s language suggested that perhaps it would require an actual violation” for the employee’s 
actions to constitute “protected activity” for a Title VII antiretaliation claim). Compare Byers v. 
Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that an employee had 
engaged in protected conduct under Title VII so long as he had a reasonable belief that his 
employer had engaged in unlawful conduct), with EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. 
Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (holding that in order for an employee to have engaged in 
“protected activity” under Title VII, the employer must have actually committed an unlawful 
employment practice). 
431 See, e.g., Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 469–70 (Okla. 2001) (declining to 
recognize a state law claim for “public employees who complain about the way an organization 
is managed when the complaints merely exhibit differences of opinion or dissatisfaction with 
discretionary management decisions and the like”). 
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demonstrate a “reasonable belief” that employer conduct is illegal.432 
The most well known example of this standard stems from the 
Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County School District v. 
Breeden. In that case, the Court assumed (without deciding) that the 
reasonable-belief standard applied to Title VII retaliation cases,433 a 
decision that paved the way for courts uniformly to adopt the 
reasonable-belief standard for a broad range of statutes.434 This 
requirement involves both a subjective and an objective 
component.435 The employee must subjectively believe the conduct is 
illegal, and the employee’s belief must be objectively reasonable. The 
employee could be wrong about the legality of the employer’s 
actions, but as long as the employee’s belief was reasonable, the law 
would still protect the employee from retaliation. Recently passed 
federal laws specifically require the employee to have a “reasonable 
belief” that the employer action the employee reports or opposes is 
illegal.436 
The reasonable-belief standard seems to comport with the 
Antiretaliation Principle, particularly when compared with the fact 
that courts could interpret some statutory language to protect only 
reports of actual violations.437 Despite this seemingly employee-
                                                                                                                 
432 See Brake, supra note 7, at 76–77 (discussing how and why courts do not require 
plaintiffs to prove that their employers actually engaged in unlawful conduct). 
433 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). 
434 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1129 n.7 (“Although the [Breeden] Court specifically 
declined to answer the question regarding what an opposition-clause plaintiff must prove with 
respect to this issue, since Breeden, courts within all United States circuits have adopted the 
objectively reasonable standard.”). Courts also use the reasonable-belief standard for other 
statutes that do not specify the standard to be utilized, such as Title VI and Title IX. See Brake, 
supra note 7, at 83 n.223 (collecting cases).  
435 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1134 (“[C]ourts evaluate whether the employee had a 
subjective, good-faith belief that the activity was unlawful, and whether that belief was 
objectively reasonable.”). 
436 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006) 
(providing antiretaliation protection to employees who reasonably believe that their employer 
has engaged in unlawful conduct). 
437 Some commentators have reviewed this landscape and suggested that an even more 
lenient standard might better encourage employees to come forward with information of 
potential wrongdoing. For example, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal argues that a “good faith” 
standard would comport with an appropriately broad reading of Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision to encourage employees to report violations of the statute. See Rosenthal, supra note 
67, at 1130–31 (arguing that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision should protect employees who 
report on an employer in subjective good faith, even if the employee is wrong or the employee’s 
belief is unreasonable). In the case of Title VII, at least, Professor Rosenthal acknowledges that 
courts likely would reject a purely subjective good-faith standard given the statutory language 
and courts’ interpretation of the language after Breeden, as well as EEOC interpretations that 
support a “reasonable belief” requirement. Id.; see also Brake, supra note 7, at 81 n.215 
(arguing that the Court’s decision in Breeden “forecloses a more lenient standard requiring only 
a subjective good faith belief”). More broadly, the statutory language of more recently enacted 
antiretaliation provisions explicitly utilizes the “reasonable belief” standard, which would seem 
to preclude courts from using the good-faith standard. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
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friendly standard, however, lower courts often have applied the 
reasonable-belief requirement to narrow, rather than broaden, 
retaliation protection.438 In many cases, lower courts have turned 
Breeden’s “reasonable belief” standard into an implicit requirement 
that an employee report actual violations of the law.439 These courts 
have required employees to know the subtle intricacies of the 
substantive law allegedly being violated by their employer in order to 
conclude that an employee had a reasonable belief that an illegality 
occurred.440 For example, in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,441 
the Fourth Circuit held that an employee who reported a co-
employee’s use of a racial slur was not protected from retaliation, 
because no employee could have reasonably thought that a one-time 
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006) (granting antiretaliation protection to employees of 
publicly traded companies who report against their employers with a reasonable belief that the 
employer’s conduct is illegal); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 1553(a), 123 Stat. 115, 297 (to be codified in 26 U.S.C.) (utilizing the reasonable-belief 
standard to protect whistleblowing employees in state and local governments).  
438 See Brake, supra note 7, at 76 (“One of the most problematic limits [imposed by courts] 
is the requirement that the challenger have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct 
amounts to unlawful discrimination. Through this doctrine, courts have reinforced selective and 
narrow interpretations of discrimination, while labeling broader conceptions as unreasonable.”); 
Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation 
Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1472–73 (2007) (arguing that courts often apply the 
reasonableness standard so narrowly that it deprives complaining employees of antiretaliation 
protections).  
439 See Moberly, supra note 131, at 1003 & n.161 (arguing that many courts have applied 
the “reasonable belief” standard so as to require employees to prove that their employers have 
violated the law); Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1162–63 (“[M]any courts . . . do not seem to be 
taking into account the ‘limited knowledge’ most Title VII plaintiffs have about the contours of 
Title VII, and the courts have consistently ruled against employees after concluding that their 
belief of a Title VII violation was not objectively reasonable.”). 
440 See, e.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416–17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
reasonableness of a report of illegality should be judged by whether a reasonable jury could find 
the conduct illegal); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (remanding a Title VI 
retaliation claim to the district court so that the plaintiff could further develop the record to 
show that she had a reasonable belief that her employer had engaged in intentional 
discrimination); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 708 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“In conclusion, Hamner’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because the 
conduct that he opposed (harassment because of his sexual orientation) is not, under any 
circumstances, proscribed by Title VII, and thus he has failed to provide sufficient evidence for 
a reasonable jury to conclude that he opposed (or reasonably believed that he was opposing) an 
unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”); Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold 
Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying the plaintiff’s Title VII antiretaliation claim 
because the plaintiff could not reasonably believe that a single racially offensive remark was 
unlawful conduct); Holmes v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 96 V 6196 (NG), 2001 WL 797951, at 
*6 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2001) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim because the 
plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that isolated and minor instances of offensive 
conduct violated Title VII); see also Brake, supra note 7, at 86–98 (discussing how courts apply 
the “reasonable belief” standard to reinforce narrow constructions of unlawful or discriminatory 
behavior). 
441 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).  
 2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE 449 
use of a racial epitaph violated Title VII.442 The Jordan court, 
however, seemed more intent on examining whether the incident 
could have amounted to unlawful harassment rather than on whether 
the employee could have reasonably believed that the conduct was 
unlawful.443  
The Antiretaliation Principle could affect courts’ thinking about 
how to interpret the reasonable-belief standard so as to more fully 
incorporate the Principle’s law-enforcement goals. The Jordan 
court’s narrow construction underestimates the chilling effect of 
retaliation and fails to consider that employees typically do not have 
legal expertise. Broader construction of the “protected activity” 
requirement might better support society’s interest in law 
enforcement. This law-enforcement interest will be better served 
because employees—lay persons with no legal background or 
expertise—will feel more free to report an employer’s questionable 
conduct. Society would be better off with knowledgeable 
decisionmakers determining whether the disclosed, questionable 
conduct violates the law after an employee’s report, instead of lay 
employees trying to determine legality before they report. This 
broader protection should cause a court to be less interested in 
whether the employee’s report precisely identified an explicit 
violation of law, and more interested in the employer’s response to 
that report. 
Moreover, other Supreme Court retaliation precedent supports a 
more nuanced view of an employee’s background when considering 
whether the employee objectively acted reasonably. In Burlington 
Northern, the Court examined what type of employer action might be 
deemed sufficiently adverse to constitute “retaliation” under Title 
VII.444 As noted above, the Court concluded that retaliation occurred 
if the employer’s action “could well dissuade a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”445 Later in the 
opinion, the Court stated that when courts consider the “reasonable 
employee,” they should take into account the specific employee’s 
                                                                                                                 
442 Id. at 339 (stating that an unlawful employment practice under Title VII requires a 
workplace “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 
working environment” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 
(1998) (noting that one incident typically cannot create a hostile work environment that is 
actionable under Title VII, unless the incident is sufficiently severe). 
443 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341–43 (discussing whether the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint 
could support a finding that his employer engaged in unlawful conduct). 
444 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
445 Id. 
 2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM 
450 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
individual circumstances. “[T]he significance of any given act of 
retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. 
Context matters.”446  
In the same way, lower courts could fix the problems caused by 
narrow interpretations of the “reasonable belief” standard by 
explicating what the law expects from an employee when reporting 
misconduct. Retaliation law should protect only “reasonable” reports, 
but that standard should consider the education level and expertise of 
the employee making the report, as well as the employee’s own 
employment experiences with the employer.447 In-house counsel may 
be expected to know the intricate details of sexual-harassment law, 
but perhaps a worker with a high-school education should not.448 
Accountants may be expected to understand whether the securities 
regulations have been violated, but should be given leeway when a 
law’s language can lead to different reasonable interpretations.449  
                                                                                                                 
446 Id. at 69. As Professor Deborah Brake has pointed out, the Ninth Circuit in Breeden 
adopted a similarly nuanced standard that the Supreme Court ignored: 
[T]he Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Breeden exhibited a more appropriate 
measure of caution, emphasizing the need to take into account “‘the limited 
knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of 
their claims.’” The Ninth Circuit evaluated reasonableness from the perspective of a 
Title VII plaintiff. The Supreme Court’s cursory discussion of reasonableness 
clouded the question of perspective and implicitly adopted the Court’s own 
perspective, shaped by the limits of existing case law. 
Brake, supra note 7, at 82–83 (footnotes omitted). 
447 See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1179 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 
subjective sensibilities of an alleged victim may be a relevant consideration in determining 
whether conduct by a supervisor or a coworker is legally sanctionable.”); cf. Brake, supra note 
7, at 103 (“[Courts should] ask whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case that the practices 
opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of discrimination law. . . . The perspective from 
which reasonableness is measured should not be that of the judge reading and selecting the 
dominant legal precedents, but the reasonable employee, student, or person in the organization 
who wishes to further the goals of discrimination law: dismantling unjust privilege and 
promoting the conditions necessary for equal citizenship.”). 
448 Compare Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 Fed. App’x 499, 503 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam) (holding that a waitress could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that her 
manager’s isolated jokes and comments about her breasts had violated Title VII), with Nuskey 
v. Hochberg, 657 F. Supp. 2d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2009) (“If plaintiff relied on an EEO training to 
conclude that Title VII had been violated, her belief was in good faith and was not 
unreasonable—even if her conclusion ultimately proved to be incorrect.”). 
449 Cf. Allen v. Stewart Enterp., Inc., ARB No. 06-081, at 14 (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/arb/decisions/arb_decisions/sox/06_081.soxp.pdf (holding that a 
lay-employee could not have had a “reasonable belief” that her employer had violated the SEC’s 
regulations concerning “internal consolidated financial statements” because she had “testified 
that she was not aware of any SEC rule or regulation requiring that these internal documents be 
filed with the SEC or comply with SEC rules and regulations”). In Allen, the employee alleged 
that she examined “internal consolidated financial statements” and that these statements 
indicated that the company violated an SEC rule. Id. The Administrative Review Board (ARB), 
however, found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule violation was not protected 
because these internal reports did not have to be filed with the SEC, and, therefore, the employer 
could not have violated SEC regulations. Id. Based on this nuance, the ARB found that the 
employee could not have “reasonably believed” that a violation of the rule occurred. Id.; see 
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Lower courts can best support the Antiretaliation Principle by 
recognizing that employees typically are not lawyers and therefore 
should not be required to evaluate numerous legal nuances before 
reporting misconduct. Law-enforcement experts and supervisors 
should be charged with determining whether the law is being violated, 
not employees. The law should simply encourage employees to come 
forward with information that a reasonable person with their 
knowledge and educational experience would believe to be a violation 
of the law. The easiest way to encourage that process is to protect a 
broad range of activity and then closely evaluate the employer’s 
response. In other words, the Antiretaliation Principle best protects 
society’s interest when the scrutiny in retaliation cases is directed 
towards the employer’s response to whistleblowing, rather than the 
employee’s actions when blowing the whistle. Lower courts would 
help achieve this result by loosening the “reasonable belief” standard 
to permit the protection of more reports of potentially illegal conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
In Supreme Court retaliation cases, despite the Court’s employer-
friendly outlook and conservative judicial philosophy, it has protected 
employees who act to enforce society’s laws. The lesson from the 
Court’s use of the Antiretaliation Principle over the last fifty years 
and, in particular, during the last five years, is that the Court rightly 
values retaliation protection. Protecting employees from retaliation 
when they disclose an employer’s illegal behavior advances society’s 
goal of strong law enforcement. The Supreme Court and lower courts 
should work to further the Antiretaliation Principle by strengthening 
the protections available to whistleblowers who report illegal 
corporate behavior.  
Although this Article has detailed the ways in which the 
Antiretaliation Principle can aid courts in retaliation cases, Congress 
could learn from the Principle as well. In a subsequent article, I will 
detail how Congress can better utilize employees for law-enforcement 
purposes. For example, at a minimum, Congress could update older 
statutes to explicitly provide employees strong antiretaliation 
protection, which would relieve the Supreme Court of having to 
                                                                                                                 
 
also Jason M. Zuckerman, SOX’s Whistleblower Provision—Promise Unfulfilled, SEC. LITIG. 
REP., July/Aug. 2007, at 14, 16–17 (discussing the ARB’s interpretation of the “reasonable 
belief” standard); cf. Gorod, supra note 438, at 1484–96 (criticizing the “reasonable belief” 
standard because courts may use it to improperly reject Title VII retaliation claims by lay 
employees who are unaware of the law and its nuances). 
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perform jurisprudential gymnastics to satisfy the Antiretaliation 
Principle.450 Furthermore, the Court’s Antiretaliation Principle 
teaches that Congress and its statutes are better at protecting 
employees from retaliation than the First Amendment. Accordingly, 
Congress could encourage the reporting of illegal conduct in the 
government by improving the statutory whistleblower protections for 
federal employees. 
In fact, identifying the Supreme Court’s use of the Antiretaliation 
Principle helps focus attention on the fact that the Court itself often 
answers questions that might be answered best by Congress: Which 
laws should be enforced by relying, at least in part, on employee 
disclosures? Which employees should be protected from retaliation if 
they disclose illegalities? To whom should employees be required to 
disclose misconduct in order to be protected? What type of retaliation 
should be prohibited? In its recent retaliation cases, the Supreme 
Court had to answer these questions because Congress did not. 
Democratic norms suggest that the legislature as well as the courts 
should broadly implement the Antiretaliation Principle and balance 
employer and employee interests with society’s interest in law 
enforcement. Until Congress addresses these questions more 
consistently, however, it appears that the Supreme Court is willing to 
step into the breach to protect employees who report illegal conduct. 
 
                                                                                                                 
450 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties of finding implied retaliation 
protection in Title IX, § 1981, and the federal sector provision of the ADEA). 
